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Abstract
In response to the intensification of economic crises in the euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB), along with other
central banks, has conducted both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. The most recent unconventional mea-
sure has been outright asset purchases under the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) targeting euro-denominated
investment-grade bonds issued by non-financial corporations in the euro area. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DID) ap-
proach on a sample of euro-zone data I find that the CSPP initiative has consistently contained credit risk. In contrast, spillover
effects to firms not subject to the CSPP policy are limited.
Keywords: quantitative easing; unconventional monetary policy; asset purchase program; credit default swaps; corporate
sector purchase program
1. Introduction
‘Likewise, the credit easing components of our
expanded asset purchase programme (APP),
namely the asset-backed securities (ABSPP), cov-
ered bond (CBPP3) and corporate sector (CSPP)
purchase programmes, further boost the pass-
through of our monetary policy by directly low-
ering the financing costs for crucial actors in our
economy. [. . . ] the CSPP directly lowers the cost
and improves the availability of market-based
funding for non-financial corporations.’ - Mario
Draghi, ECB President, Brussels, 26 September
2016
After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008,
confidence in the world economy collapsed and international
financial markets became severely disrupted. Soon the Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis followed, posing further chal-
lenges for the euro area. In response, the ECB not only im-
plemented a drastic cut in its official interest rates, but also
introduced a package of non-standard monetary policy mea-
sures. These measures were motivated by the need to en-
sure the continued effectiveness of the transmission of the
monetary policy stance to the real economy and ultimately to
price developments (Giannone et al., 2011). Yet in Europe,
financial markets remained dysfunctional with credit condi-
tions tightening markedly, and the risk of depressed inflation
rates. As a complement to existing unconventional measures
the CSPP has been launched, with a first formal announce-
ment in March 2016. In effect, the ECB has expanded its
quantitative easing (QE) programme to include the purchase
of non-financial corporate bonds. The CSPP commenced offi-
cially on June 8th, 2016, with the objective to provide further
monetary policy accommodation and contribute to a return
of inflation rates to levels below, but close to two percent
(European Central Bank, 2016). On average seven billion
euro corporate bonds are bought each month. By the end
of November 2017, CSPP purchases had reached a total of
€ 128 billion.
According to the ECB, this QE programme accounts for
a large decline in funding costs for both financial and non-
financial corporations in the eurozone. At the same time, the
programme contributes to the bypassing of financial interme-
diaries by an increased availability of credit. Thus, by means
of the CSPP, the ECB has been able to lift credit constraints
notably, in an environment where the financial system has
been subject to considerable stress (European Central Bank,
2016). Empirical research, placing a special focus on the cor-
porate bond market, further confirms the effective transmis-
sion of the monetary policy to the real economy. While the
response of cash market instruments to unconventional mon-
etary policy measures has been investigated thoroughly in the
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literature, especially for those measures longer in place, evi-
dence on derivative markets is scarce. This paper contributes
to the literature by documenting the effect of the CSPP on
credit derivatives.
Indeed, it is inappropriate to focus only on the cash
market when assessing the CSPP impact. As emphasized
by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Eser
and Schwaab (2016), QE programmes work through various
channels. In this paper I will particularly address the default
risk channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel. First,
given the CSPP succeeds in stimulating the economy by low-
ering borrowing costs for corporates, one should observe a
reduction in expected defaults and, as a result, a decline in
corporate credit risk. Moreover, as the economic recovers,
standard asset pricing models imply - beyond the compensa-
tion for expected defaults - a reduction in the average price
for assuming exposure to corporate credit risk. In fact, in-
vestors’ risk aversion is expected to decline, implying a lower
default risk perception, and ultimately a lower default risk
premium (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2013). My second con-
jecture is that the CSPP policy may contribute endogenously
through spillover effects, in line with the theory of the portfo-
lio rebalancing channel (Altavilla et al., 2015). The sizeable
compression of funding costs induced by the CSPP should
be reflected in substantially lower costs of default insurance,
especially for riskier credits. More specifically, this line of ar-
gument suggests that, while credit risk has reduced overall,
the policy impact is not restricted to CSPP-eligible assets but
extends beyond the eligibility criteria.
The objective of this paper is to quantify these impacts
undertaken within the CSPP framework on market-based
measures of corporate credit risk; in particular on credit
default swap (CDS) spreads. In essence, I assess whether
CDS show price reactions consistent with the intentions be-
hind the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. The market of
single name CDS is of particular interest because, by their
nature, these innovative instruments equip researchers with
a near-ideal way of directly measuring credit risk (Longstaff
et al., 2005, Norden and Weber, 2009). In general, CDS1
are bilateral contracts that provide protection against the
risk of a credit event associated with a particular company
or country. Hence, they serve as a vehicle through which
market participants are able to isolate and transfer credit
risk (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
Using a panel of eurozone CDS data, I seek to empirically
investigate the effect of the CSPP event on firms’ CDS spreads
within a DID framework. The empirical strategy identifies the
distinct CSPP purchase dates as the most important piece of
information to causally link the CSPP with the outcome of
interest. In fact, by exploiting the phased implementation of
1Unlike multiname CDS, the underlying of single-name CDS refers to a
single firm or entity. Multi-name CDS such as basket CDS or CDS indices,
on the other hand, are written on a set of firms. Analysing multi-name CDS
is beyond the scope of the present study. As my focus is on singlename CDS,
in the following, I will use the terms single-name CDS and CDS interchange-
ably.
the CSPP policy, I am able to address the endogeneity con-
cern of non-random assignment of CSPP-eligible bonds. In
other words, the distinct purchase dates allow a comparison
between the subsample of firms transferred primarily to the
CSPP portfolio (treatment group) and firms transferred later
(control group). In this vein, the full sample is restricted to
CSPP firms only. The within CSPP-sample analysis then miti-
gates any concerns related to heterogeneity within the treat-
ment group in response to the CSPP, and ultimately any con-
cerns related to omitted variables. Apart from that, the DID
estimation is undertaken on a set of firms within the same
industry.
Consistent with the initial assumption, I find that the
CSPP programme has contained credit risk across European
non-financial corporates. The results indicate that credit
market reactions to the CSPP event - measured by means of
CDS prices - imply negative CDS rates throughout. The most
pronounced impact in lowering credit risk can be observed
for the sector of Basic Materials, accounting for a CDS spread
decrease of approximately 8 percent. In contrast, the empir-
ical support for the second conjecture is limited. Spillover
effects to firms not yet subject to the CSPP are heteroge-
neous within and across industries, and if anything, rather
bond specific. For example, within the Industrial sector, I
observe considerable spillover effects of around 6 percent-
age points for a given reference firm. However, a precedent
bond purchase referring to the same firm does not prompt
any spillovers. Hence, the ECB’s commitment to continue the
CSPP is indeed helping to lift credit constraints overall, but
according to my estimation the initiative seems to not have
stronger effects on firms unaffected by the CSPP, as suggested
by previous work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discloses the ECB’s monetary policy strategy as a response
to the global financial and the European sovereign debt cri-
sis, with a special focus on the CSPP initiative. Section 3
provides a brief overview over corporate CDS and highlights
their importance as a corporate credit risk measure. Section
4 introduces two hypotheses as well as describes the under-
lying empirical strategy and the sample data. In Section 5
the main empirical findings of the CSPP impact on corporate
CDS are presented and discussed. The paper closes with a
discussion in Section 6.
2. A New Wave of Unconventional Monetary Policy
The Governing Council of the ECB assesses economic and
monetary developments and takes monetary policy decisions
every six weeks (European Central Bank Website, 2018b).
The primary objective of its monetary policy stance is to
maintain price stability within the Eurozone. In particular,
price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of below two percent
(European Central Bank, 2011). Recent economic shocks
have posed significant challenges for the euro area. In re-
sponse, the ECB has not only cut its official interest rates
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significantly, but also has adopted a series of unconventional
monetary policy measures such as the CSPP.
2.1. ECB’s Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
In general, conventional monetary policy operates by
steering nominal short-term interest rates at which commer-
cial banks can borrow funds from and deposit funds at the
central bank (Joyce et al., 2012). The underlying economic
rationale is to lower these key interest rates during economic
downturns and to increase them during economic upturns.2
In this manner, the central bank effectively manages the liq-
uidity conditions in money markets. For decades the ECB
has successfully relied on this standard interest rate channel
to fulfil its price stability mandate over the medium term.
However, such measures are no longer sensible when
interest rates are already close to the zero bound. The zero
lower bound describes the notion that interest rates cannot
be below zero percent. If so, agents in the economy would
hold zero interest cash instead (Keynes, 1936). Hence, as
soon as interest rates are close to the effective lower bound,
conventional interest rate targeting will cease to be effective
and central bank authorities will have to opt for unconven-
tional measures to stabilize price levels in particular and
the economy in general (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003,
Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004, Hamilton and Wu, 2012,
Woodford, 2012).
Indeed, in the wake of the global financial crisis - soon fol-
lowed by the sovereign debt crisis in several euro area coun-
tries - interest rates quickly approached the effective lower
bound. Nonetheless, given the scale of losses incurred in the
aftermath of the crisis the financial system remained dysfunc-
tional. In fact, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
interbank market liquidity virtually dried up. Banks aban-
doned making loans and asset prices dropped dramatically
leaving the financial system as a whole exposed to the risk
of a liquidity trap, in which each economic agent is keen to
hoard liquidity (Beirne et al., 2011, Joyce et al., 2012). The
spread between the three-month risky interbank rate (EURI-
BOR) and the overnight interest rate (EONIA) - a key factor
to evaluate the health of the European interbank market -
rose to a new all-time high of 156 basis points in October 13,
2008 (Bini Smaghi, 2009). This ongoing tension within fi-
nancial markets left the monetary policy transmission process
severely impaired. Thus, the ECB was eager to provide ad-
ditional monetary stimulus to the economy beyond the stan-
dard interest rate channel (Joyce et al., 2012, Fawley and
Neely, 2013).
Broadly speaking, unconventional measures are defined
as those policies that directly cope with funding needs of
banks, households and non-financial companies. Financial
support by the central bank authority can be provided in the
form of central bank liquidity, loans, fixed-income securities
2In particular, the ECB sets the target overnight interest rate in the in-
terbank money market, in this manner, signaling the desired policy rate.
Hereof, the prominent Taylor rules provide guidelines regarding the level of
short-run benchmark rates (Taylor, 1993).
or equity. Principally, as the cost of external finance is traded
at a premium, the set of unconventional measures can be
regarded as an attempt to reduce specific risk premia. Par-
ticularly, the central bank may reduce term spreads between
short and long-term rates and/or credit spreads between risk-
free assets and risky assets, eventually influencing wealth,
cost of borrowing, spending and income (Joyce and Tong,
2012, Mertens, 2017).
In general, central bank authorities can select from a wide
range of unconventional measures which are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Typically, they also serve as a comple-
ment to standard interest rate decisions rather than to sub-
stitute for them (Giannone et al., 2011). The final choice
depends on institutional features, the structure of the finan-
cial system, the degree of disruption within markets and most
importantly the intermediate objectives. A stylized represen-
tation of potential measures is shown in Figure 1. As demon-
strated, unconventional monetary policy can be allocated to
two broad categories: forward guidance or balance sheet
measures. Forward guidance represents the central bank’s
commitment to the public to maintain its accommodative
monetary policy over an extended period, such as to keep
short-term interest rates low for a significant period of time.3
In fact, the speech by the ECB’s president Mario Draghi on
July 26, 2012, in which he stated that ‘the ECB is ready to do
whatever it takes to preserve the Euro’, may be interpreted
as a forward guidance tool (Draghi, 2012).
In stark contrast, balance sheet measures affect explic-
itly the size or the composition of the central bank’s balance
sheet, officially known as quantitative easing or credit eas-
ing. The subset can be further differentiated into direct and
indirect measures. With direct measures in place, the cen-
tral bank engages in direct acquisition of assets, until matu-
rity or resale, and thus assumes the associated risks4 on its
balance sheet. In standard literature outright asset purchase
programmes such as the CSPP are identified as a direct QE
policy, see for example Draghi (2016), Abidi et al. (2017) and
Arce et al. (2017). Through the indirect approach the central
bank lends to other banks at longer maturities in exchange
for collateral, including assets whose markets are temporar-
ily impaired. By this means the central bank does not as-
sume any risks on its balance sheet (Woodford, 2012). Usu-
ally, indirect measures lead to a relatively small or even no
increase of the central bank’s balance sheet, whereas asset
purchase programmes within the QE framework are under-
taken in large and highly liquid market segments, that in turn
lead to a substantial expansion of the central bank’s balance
sheet (Mertens, 2017). A deeper investigation into each un-
conventional measure conducted by the ECB is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a detailed overview, see the contri-
butions by the former ECB executive board member Lorenzo
Bini Smaghi (Bini Smaghi, 2009).
3In principle, this communicative instrument can be conditional or un-
conditional. For more details see Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
4Potential risk sources to the balance sheet may materialize through in-
terest rate risk, market risk, sovereign risk or credit risk.
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Figure 1: Unconventional Monetary Policy; Source: Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bini Smaghi (2009), Draghi (2016).
Unconventional monetary policy is based on the idea that the central bank can stimulate the economy, even when short-term
interest rates are at or close to zero. The figure shows the different measures that central banks may adopt. Broadly, these
measures can be differentiated between forward guidance and balance sheet measures. All policies related to quantitative
easing and credit easing are a subset of balance sheet measures.
Given that the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) is a bank-based economy, the first set of unconven-
tional measures adopted by the ECB - officially known as
the ‘Enhanced Credit Support’ - was directed at banks (Faw-
ley and Neely, 2013, Mertens, 2017). In this context, the
former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet stressed that the
ECB would neither involve in direct credit easing nor in di-
rect quantitative easing, as implemented by other major cen-
tral banks at that time, but focus on endogenous measures.5
The policy comprised five building blocks: fixed-rate full-
allotment (FRFA), expansion of eligible collateral, longer-
term liquidity provision, liquidity provision in foreign curren-
cies and financial market support through purchases of cov-
ered bonds (CBPP1).6 At some later stage, the ECB also de-
cided to offer accommodative refinancing facilities for banks
over longer periods of time by means of its longer-term re-
5Japan has become known for its QE policy with the expansion of the
monetary base through outright purchases of government bonds from the
banking sector. By contrast, the Bank of England has bought British govern-
ment bonds from the non-bank private sector. The US Federal Reserve was
initially rather engaged in credit easing by providing direct lending facilities
to market participants but over the course of time it has resorted to QE ini-
tiatives as well, buying securities from government agencies (Trichet, 2009,
Joyce et al., 2012).
6For instance, the CBPP1 as an indirect measure was initiated to allevi-
ate the potential risk of a bank run given the maturity mismatch banks are
exposed to when granting long-term loans, financed by short-term deposits
(Joyce et al., 2012, Fawley and Neely, 2013).
financing operations (LTRO) programme. Overall, this in-
direct approach was intended to primarily alleviate grow-
ing tensions in interbank money markets, to expand bank-
lending operations and ultimately to ensure the transmission
of the ECB’s policy stance to the real economy (Trichet, 2009,
Joyce et al., 2012, Fawley and Neely, 2013, Szczerbowicz
et al., 2015, Eser and Schwaab, 2016).
Yet, in spite of these efforts, the European debt cri-
sis deepened further as banks were heavily exposed to
risky sovereign debt issued by periphery Eurozone coun-
tries (Szczerbowicz et al., 2015). At its height in 2012, the
ECB eventually decided to extend its unconventional policy
toolkit and resort to direct measures. The ECB was able to
calm financial markets by announcing conditional support
by means of a sovereign state bailout programme, namely
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). In addition, pur-
chases in sovereign debt markets within the Securities Mar-
kets Programme (SMP) framework had been announced.
Nonetheless, the SMP was not deliberately designed as a QE-
type programme (Eser and Schwaab, 2016, Schlepper et al.,
2017).
The trend-breaking effect in ECB’s monetary policy stance
was actually induced in January 2015, with the introduction
of the expanded asset purchase programme (APP). Eventu-
ally, the ECB joined several other central banks in implement-
ing QE with outright purchases of EMU government bonds on
an unprecedented scale. Since then the programme has been
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modified and amended several times. For example, in Octo-
ber 2017, the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) - as
one pillar of the APP - was reduced from a monthly purchase
pace of€ 60 billion to€ 30 billion (Andrade et al., 2016, Eu-
ropean Central Bank, 2017b). While the APP policy was ini-
tially launched to restore the smooth functioning of financial
markets, concerns soon shifted to stimulate real growth and
contain undesirable disinflation (Fawley and Neely, 2013).
In general, when central banks opt for direct purchases
of securities in the capital market, they have to set at least
five key parameters to define their programmes. First, they
need to decide on the asset class to be bought. Second, they
are required to choose the respective volume in order to de-
fine the impact of the programme. Finally, with the selec-
tion of the remaining three parameters, the central bank can
fine-tune the QE policy, particularly, in terms of maturity, rat-
ing and liquidity (Mertens, 2017). Over time, the ECB has
implemented a wide range of purchase programmes varying
these parameters to target specific risk premia. However, all
of them share the common goal of easing funding conditions
for financial and non-financial corporations. Table 1 summa-
rizes the ECB’s purchase programmes since 2009 in a chrono-
logical order.
The most significant shift in ECB’s monetary policy has
been the launch of the CSPP in March 2016, as a part of the
APP. In contrast to previous purchases programmes, primar-
ily focusing on the economy or the public sector in general,
the key feature of the CSPP is that it is specifically directed
at assets in the non-financial sector (Mertens, 2017). Basi-
cally, the CSPP represents a suitable alternative in providing
credit to corporates by bypassing the banking system (Arce
et al., 2017, Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2017). Despite the
extra liquidity facilities provided by the ECB, banks have fre-
quently been unable to adequately provide credit to the real
economy due to, inter alia, the non-performing loan burden,
higher regulatory requirements and ongoing restructuring.
Faced with declining incomes, tightening prudential regu-
lation7 and high levels of debt, banks rather have utilized
the additional funds to deleverage their own debt positions
(Joyce et al., 2012, Demertzis and Wolff, 2016).
As a consequence, the CSPP has been carried out - jointly
with a further cut in the deposit facility rate and a new series
of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO
II) - to address these transmission failures. In this way the
ECB can take on the risk that banks are currently unable or
unwilling to take. Hence, the CSPP is to be understood as
complementary to the main thrust of the APP supposed to
enhance the impact of previous QE policies (European Cen-
tral Bank, 2016, Abidi et al., 2017). Figure 2 displays the
dynamics of the APP policy. While the Eurosystem’s total
holdings have increased constantly over time, the CSPP share
over total APP holdings is comparatively small. In fact, the
outstanding volume under the CSPP (€ 128 billion) accounts
7Basel III has strengthened the capital adequacy and liquidity rules, upon
which banks are required to adhere to.
solely for 6 percent of total APP holdings (€ 2,243 billion) by
November 2017.
Addressing CSPP’s effectiveness will almost inevitably be
part of a bigger picture that includes insights into recent
global monetary policy developments. Given this goal, it is
useful at the outset to dig deeper into the technical features
of the CSPP policy.
2.2. ECB’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme
The Governing Council of the ECB announced at its
March 10, 2016 meeting the launch of the CSPP as an ex-
tended leg of its QE programme.8 Operations commenced
three months later, on June 8th as demonstrated in Table 1.
Under the CSPP, the Eurosystem buys debt securities issued
by non-financial corporations with the goal of consolidating
the pass-through of the monetary policy stance to the real
economy. The Governing Council is committed to continue
CSPP purchases without imposing any temporal restrictions.
In conjunction with other non-standard measures in place,
the CSPP is intended to stimulate spending and thereby
maintain inflation rate levels below, but close to, two percent
in the medium term (European Central Bank, 2016).
The programme is coordinated by the ECB, but carried
out by six national central banks acting on behalf of the Eu-
rosystem. These include the central banks of Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Each central bank
is responsible for purchases from issuers in a particular re-
gion of the euro area (Abidi et al., 2017). Hereby the ECB
acts as a buy-and-hold investor. Assets purchased under the
programme are held until maturity and the principal is rein-
vested even after a possible termination of the purchase pro-
gramme (Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2017). As a necessary
condition, assets must be acceptable as collateral for Eu-
rosystem credit operations,9 subject to further criteria as ex-
plained hereafter (European Central Bank, 2016, Abidi et al.,
2017). As mentioned previously, asset purchase programmes
are carefully designed by central bank authorities to ensure
that the bond portfolio purchased under the CSPP has a rea-
sonable level of risk and a certain degree of diversification.
As part of its plan, the ECB buys only euro area bonds
issued by non-financial corporations denominated in euro.
The ultimate parent company may as well be located outside
the eurozone region, however the issuer must be established
within the euro area. Public undertakings and credit insti-
tutions that are subject to banking supervision are excluded
altogether. This rule also applies to issuers that have any
8Note that the main technical parameters of the programme were an-
nounced on April 21, 2016 (Abidi et al., 2017).
9In compliance with its statute, the ECB provides credit only against ade-
quate collateral. Collateral comprises both marketable and non-marketable
assets. In general, assets that are accepted as collateral by the Eurosystem
are labelled as ‘eligible’ and the eligibility is assessed by national central
banks according to the criteria specified in the Eurosystem’s General Doc-
umentation (Tamura and Tabakis, 2013). The list of marketable eligible
collateral is updated daily and published on the ECB’s website.
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Table 1: ECB’s Purchase Programmes; Source: European Central Bank (2015), Andrade et al. (2016), European Central Bank
(2017b), Mertens (2017).
The table lists all purchase programmes conducted by the ECB since 2009. The column ‘End’ states the termination date of the programme. As some purchase
programmes are still in place, corresponding rows are yet empty. This is true for CBPP3, asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP), PSPP and
CSPP which are all part of the APP. The abbreviation p.m. in the Volume column indicates that purchases are carried out per month. Note that except for the
CSPP all asset purchase programmes have been initiated to stabilize banks’ balance sheets.
Start End Asset Class Volume Rating Maturity
CBPP1 July 2009 June 2010 Covered Bonds 60 AA unlimited
SMP May 2010 Sep 12 Government Bonds unlimited unlimited unlimited
CBPP2 Nov 11 October 2012 Covered Bonds 40 BBB- ≤10.5y
CBPP3 October 2014 Covered Bonds unlimited BBB- unlimited
ABSPP Nov 14 Asset Backed Securities unlimited BBB- unlimited
PSPP March 2015 Public Sector Assets 30 p. m. BBB- 2-30y
CSPP June 2016 Corporate Bonds 80 p. m. BBB- 6m-30y
Figure 2: ECB’s Expanded Asset Purchase Programme Holdings; Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (author’s own
computations).
The figure shows the Eurosystem’s total holdings under the APP at the end of the month, represented by the right scale and
denominated in euro. Moreover, the breakdown of the APP by each subprogramme is illustrated. The observation window
ranges from October 2014 to November 2017.
parent undertaking which is a credit institution (Abidi et al.,
2017, Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2017). 10
Moreover, in order to qualify for purchase under the CSPP,
securities must satisfy a minimum credit rating of at least
investment grade (BBB-/Baa3/BBBL) assigned by an exter-
nal rating agency. In accordance with the practice followed
under its collateral framework, the Eurosystem recognizes
10More precisely, bonds issued by an entity which is supervised under the
Single Supervisory Mechanism are not eligible for purchase under the CSPP.
At the same time, in order to ensure a level playing field between euro area
and foreign issuers, issuers with a parent company that is subject to banking
supervision outside the euro area are excluded as well (European Central
Bank, 2016).
credit assessments by only four credit rating agencies such
as Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and Do-
minion Bond Rating Services. Most noteworthy, in the event
of a deterioration of the issuer’s credit quality, the ECB is not
obliged to sell its holdings (Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2017).
Within this context, the first-best credit rating is relevant.
More precisely, a bond that is rated below investment grade
by three rating agencies except for one will still be eligible
for admission to the CSPP programme (Abidi et al., 2017).
The maturity spectrum of debt securities can range be-
tween six months to less than 31 years at the date of the pur-
chase. The upper bound is in line with that applied under
the PSPP framework. The lower bound ensures that bonds
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issued by small and medium-sized corporations are also in-
cluded in the universe of qualifying debt instruments, while
at the same time restraining the number of redemptions dur-
ing the duration of the CSPP (European Central Bank Web-
site, 2018a). In addition, the bond’s yield to maturity has to
exceed the level of the deposit facility rate at the time of the
purchase (European Central Bank, 2016).11
Further, as the ECB seeks a market-neutral implemen-
tation of the CSPP, purchases are conducted according to a
benchmark defined at the issuer group level. The bench-
mark applied for purchases mirrors proportionally the market
value of all eligible assets outstanding whereas the market
capitalization serves as a weighting factor for the different
jurisdictions within the benchmark. The purpose of issuer
group level limits is to ensure a certain degree of diversifi-
cation and neutrality in the allocation of purchases across
corporations such that the overall portfolio is sufficiently het-
erogeneous (European Central Bank, 2017a, European Cen-
tral Bank Website, 2018a). Total purchases under the CSPP
should not exceed 70 percent of the issued value of each
bond. At the same time there is no minimum issuance vol-
ume for eligible assets. This implies that bonds issued by
small and medium-sized corporations with typically small is-
suance volumes can also be purchased (European Central
Bank, 2016, European Central Bank Website, 2018a).
To sum up, there are seven conditions a bond must meet
in order to qualify for CSPP purchases: eligibility as collateral
for Eurosystem operations, a non-financial corporation issue,
denomination in euro, an investment-grade rating, a yield
of above the deposit facility rate, a maturity of between six
months and 31 years, and an issue share limit of 70 percent
per security.
In principal, under the CSPP the Eurosystem considers
debt securities available in both the secondary and the pri-
mary market. In the latter case, it may participate in both
public and private placements. In practical terms, these pur-
chases take place concurrently and in competition with other
investors, adhering to free-market principles (European Cen-
tral Bank, 2016, Arce et al., 2017). The actual pace of pur-
chases under the CSPP depends on prevalent market condi-
tions. Monthly net purchases during the period from June
2016 to November 2017 have ranged between € 4 billion
and € 10 billion. Overall, since the start of the programme
in June 2016, on average corporate bonds worth € 7 billion
have been bought monthly (see Figure 3). By the end of
November 2017, CSPP purchases reached a total of € 128
billion, and were relatively diversified across ratings, sectors
and countries. In general, CSPP holdings follow closely the
CSPP-eligible bond universe, that is the composition of CSPP
holdings mirrors that of the CSPP-eligible bond universe (Eu-
ropean Central Bank, 2017a).
Although the ECB does not disclose the exact amount pur-
chased for each bond, a recent ECB report states that, so far,
11The deposit facility rate is the interest banks receive for depositing
money with the central bank overnight (Koijen et al., 2016).
medium credit quality companies within the utility and con-
sumer sector have attracted the most CSPP demand. The
majority of purchases have been undertaken in the secondary
market, with issues mainly from Germany and France (Euro-
pean Central Bank, 2017a).
2.3. Impact of Asset Purchases Programmes: Theory and Ev-
idence
Over the last few years, given their widespread use by
central banks, there has been a surge of theoretical and em-
pirical research that aims to shed light on the workings of
asset purchase programmes. The standard view in macroe-
conomic theory is that, in general, these programmes will not
have any effects on the macro-economy, as the monetary pol-
icy stance is fully described by the current and expected fu-
ture level of the nominal short-term interest rate. In line with
this notion, QE policies are assumed to present a mere real-
location of assets from the balance sheet of private investors
to the balance sheet of the central bank, while the realloca-
tion as such does not change asset prices. The main assump-
tion underlying this model is that of perfect substitutability
of assets. A single representative and rational agent, subject
to an infinite horizon and no credit restrictions, would then
be indifferent between assets held by the central bank and
her own assets (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, Woodford,
2012). Within this theoretical framework, the CSPP should
therefore be ineffective.
In reality, however, neither financial markets are friction-
less nor market participants do behave economically rational.
Under these circumstances, the central bank may purchase
significant quantities of assets in specific market segments
hereof limiting the supply relative to the demand. Reduc-
ing the amount of bonds outstanding - by displacing some
investors and reducing the holdings of others - will create a
scarcity effect that arbitrageurs may not be able eliminate.
Given securities are not perfect substitutes, prices will rise
and expected returns on the securities will fall, eventually
suppressing the risk premia. Put differently, purchases will
bid up the price of targeted assets thereby diminishing re-
spective yields. As of the lower yields, the private sector will
be incentivized to use the excess money in order to rebal-
ance its portfolios. Private investors will demand assets that
are similar in nature to the assets just sold to the central
bank. Subsequently, the downward pressure on yields will
not necessarily be limited to the particular asset type pur-
chased but spill over to other asset classes in neighbouring
markets (Vayanos and Vila, 2009, Bernanke, 2010). Even-
tually, the underlying mechanism of this portfolio balancing
effect will also lead to lower interest rates relevant to con-
sumption and investment spending. In fact, depressed yields
imply lower borrowing costs for firms and households, which
in turn will stimulate spending. In addition, higher asset
prices enhance spending by the implicit increase in the net
wealth of asset holders (Joyce et al., 2011a,b).
While the majority of empirical studies affirm the success-
ful transmission through the portfolio balance effect, some
researchers suggest the existence of novel channels that may
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Figure 3: CSPP Monthly Net Purchases by Transaction Method; Source: ECB Data Statistical Warehousedata (author’s own
computations).
The figure shows the breakdown of primary and secondary market monthly net purchases under the CSPP, denominated in
euro. The observation window ranges from June 2016 to November 2017.
be at work. For instance, recent literature has detected the
signaling channel, through which asset purchases by mone-
tary authorities may affect the economy. The mechanism of
the signaling channel operates indirectly when market par-
ticipants interpret and infer information from monetary pol-
icy announcements. Signals such as QE announcements may
be viewed as a commitment by the central bank to keep ex-
pected short-term interest rates low for an extended period of
time (Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2017). Alongside the signal-
ing and portfolio rebalancing channel, Joyce et al. (2011b)
address the liquidity and confidence channel. Similarly to
Mertens (2017), they refer as well to the bank-funding chan-
nel aimed at increasing liquidity in the banking sector, which
they, however, condemn as ineffective during times of severe
financial crisis. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
have been able to make a pivotal contribution and extend
the existent literature by launching in total seven channels
through which unconventional monetary policy can trans-
mit its effects. They discuss, for instance, the default risk
channel that acts through reducing corporate default risk. If
the CSPP indeed succeeds in stimulating the economy, it can
be expected that the credit default risk of corporations will
drop. Standard asset pricing models predict that investors’
risk aversion will also fall as the economy recovers. More
specifically, favourable market conditions are related to an
increase in investors’ risk appetite, underscoring the lower
default risk perception, and ultimately implying a lower de-
fault risk premium (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016, Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Gilchrist and Zakra-
jšek (2013) argue in the same manner but do not explic-
itly refer to the default risk channel. Furthermore, Eser and
Schwaab (2016) agree that asset purchases can affect the de-
fault risk perceptions of market participants. However, they
claim that this is to be attributed to the signaling channel.12
Overall, lack of consistency among researchers with re-
spect to the definition and the interpretation of channels
makes it difficult to pinpoint the CSPP impact and link it to a
single transmission channel. In my analysis I will follow re-
cent remarks by the ECB policymaker Coeure (2017) who ar-
gues in favour of the standard portfolio rebalancing channel
as the main transmission mechanism for the APP as a whole.
Moreover, I will focus on the default risk channel which is by
its nature particularly relevant for this study. The assessment
of the remaining channels will not be the object of this study
due to the limited scope of this paper.
While the exact transmission process is debated heavily in
the literature, there is broad consensus about the effective-
ness of unconventional monetary policy.13 Within this con-
text, studying the impact of asset purchases on market prices
provides the starting point for assessing a policy’s effective-
ness, as any QE intervention is very likely to have an impact
directly on markets where purchases have been conducted,
and indirectly on neighbouring markets. Hereafter, I aim to
summarize the most relevant contributions with a special fo-
cus on the literature that deals particularly with the CSPP.
Looking at the US evidence, there is a large and growing
body of literature that analyses QE policy effects on asset
prices. Pioneering evidence is presented by Gagnon et al.
(2011) in an event study on the Federal Reserve’s purchases
between December 2008 and March 2010, hereafter re-
12While Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) differentiate be-
tween the signaling channel and the default risk channel, Eser and Schwaab
(2016) relate default risk to the signaling channel.
13Note, however, that the estimated size of effects varies considerably
across studies. Heterogeneity in results derives from different measuring
methods.
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ferred to as QE1. QE1 included a variety of assets such as
mortgage-backed securities, treasury securities and agency
securities; and proved to have economically meaningful and
long-lasting effects on longer-term interest rates. Based on
key QE1 announcements dates and time series regressions,
Gagnon et al. (2011) notice large changes in the 10-year
Treasury yield relative to the 2-year Treasury yield. To put
this result into perspective, the QE1 policy has worked pre-
dominantly by mitigating the term premium. Indeed, the
10-year term premium was estimated to have been reduced
between 30 and 100 basis points overall.
In consonance with the former study, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) target the effect of the Federal Re-
serve’s QE1 programme through an event study methodology
but dig deeper into the QE mechanisms. They find that this
policy had a significant effect on yields, inter alia, through
the default risk channel. In fact, they observe a substan-
tial drop in nominal interest rates on lower-rated corporate
bonds. Most strikingly, however, the authors report declin-
ing CDS rates linked to a clear pattern across credit ratings,
ranging from Aaa to B. On the event dates related to QE1,
there is a large decrease in CDS premia especially for lower
grade firms. In particular, 5-year CDS rates of Aaa firms do
not change appreciably with QE1 (6 basis points), whereas 5-
year CDS rates written on B rated firms experience the largest
fall (991 basis points). In terms of statistical significance,
two-day changes in CDS spreads are significantly more neg-
ative for QE1 announcement days than on other days for 4
of 6 rating categories. Altogether their study suggests that -
consistent with the default risk channel - QE has reduced the
default risk premium.
Similarly, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2013) focus on the
market’s default risk perception and research the sensitivity
of credit risk - measured by means of CDS indices - to changes
in the benchmark market interest rates prompted by the US
QE announcements. The authors apply a heteroscedasticity-
based approach and find that the policy announcements have
substantially lowered the overall level of credit risk in the
economy. More specifically, for both the investment- and
speculative-grade U.S. corporate sector there are economi-
cally large and statistically significant reductions in CDS in-
dex spreads. In line with the former study, the decline in the
lower-rated CDS index is larger than in the higher-rated seg-
ment. In the financial sector, however, the response on credit
risk is much more muted. A range of subsequent studies pro-
vide supportive findings in that the Federal Reserve’s QE asset
purchases were successfully diminishing medium and long-
term interest rates, including those by Hancock and Passmore
(2011), Swanson (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), Neely
(2012), Wright (2012) and D’Amico and King (2013).
In order to avoid cultural bias and gain a sense of the uni-
versal challenges, it is crucial to investigate whether these
trends appear in other countries as well. Undeniably, for the
United Kingdom, Meier (2009) and Joyce et al. (2011a,b)
find that the Bank of England’s asset purchases between
March 2009 and January 2010 had economically signifi-
cant effects on government bond yields. Based on an event
study approach, Meier (2009) determines that the initial QE
announcements have reduced government bond yields be-
tween 35 to 60 basis points. Joyce et al. (2011a) estimate
that medium- to long-term government bond yields haven
fallen cumulatively by around 100 basis points. In addition,
they report a downward trend for corporate bond yields with
smaller effects on investment grade bonds and larger effects
on non-investment grade bonds. Further insights into the
significant impact of the first phase of Bank of England’s QE
policies have been provided by Joyce and Tong (2012) and
McLaren et al. (2014). For Japan there is also compelling
evidence that outright asset purchases have led to a drop
in long-term yields and a boost in asset prices (Lam, 2011,
Ueda, 2012, Fukunaga et al., 2015).
For the euro area, there is a set of studies that qualita-
tively supports the results ascertained in the US, the United
Kingdom and Japan. For instance, Andrade et al. (2016)
scrutinize the impact of ECB’s APP announcement across 24
studies to find a persistent decrease in 10-year sovereign
yields with effects being the largest when new interventions
are announced. Additionally, the researchers make efforts
to take into account the banking sector. Particularly, the
APP induces an increase in share prices of banks subject to
a higher proportion of sovereign bonds in their portfolios.
Apart from that the authors employ a general equilibrium
model to compare the APP to conventional monetary policy
measures. Hereof they argue that the APP has had an im-
pact similar to a 100 basis point interest rate cut. Altavilla
et al. (2015) obtain a similar set of findings confirming the
economically meaningful impact of the APP on asset prices.
They detect that the reduction in yields is more pronounced
for longer dated sovereign bonds in high-yield countries. In-
terestingly Altavilla et al. (2015) document spillover effects.
In particular, a decrease in euro area sovereign bond spreads
by 100 basis points leads to a statistically significant decrease
in corporate spreads by 63 basis points and 50 basis points
for financial and non-financial institutions, respectively. The
authors argue that this is to be attributed to the interplay
between the transmission channel and the degree of finan-
cial distress. Similar patterns also show up in a succeeding
study by De Santis (2016b) who accounts for the fact that
the APP was implicitly communicated to the market before
actual purchases had started. His econometric analysis sug-
gests that the ECB policy has reduced GDP-weighted 10-year
euro area sovereign yields by 63 basis points over the pe-
riod from September 2014 to October 2015, with vulnerable
countries benefiting the most.
Although the SMP is in general not considered a QE pol-
icy, in the literature there is some evidence that the pro-
gramme works, inter alia, through the default risk channel
and accounts for spillover effects. Hence, in the following I
will briefly outline relevant contributions. Within the SMP
framework, the ECB has engaged in purchases in five dis-
tinct sovereign markets beginning with Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal and then expanding the programme to Spain and
Italy. Based upon a panel regression model Eser and Schwaab
(2016) evaluate the yield impact of the SMP in the euro area
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sovereign bond market from 2010 to 2011. The authors esti-
mate that government bond purchases have been successfully
declining yields for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
For instance, in Greece € 1 billion of bond purchases have
lowered yields by more than 20 basis points. Further, in their
study Eser and Schwaab (2016) show that SMP purchases
have also affected CDS spreads, yet to a lesser extent as com-
pared to corresponding sovereign bond yields. While CDS
spreads for Greece have reduced by 10 basis points, inter-
estingly, for Italy the SMP impact on CDS has been positive.
The authors conclude that a positive impact of purchases on
CDS but not on the bond yield could be an indication of mar-
ket participants worrying about moral hazard but welcoming
the reduced liquidity risk premia on bonds. A related study
by Koijen et al. (2016) estimates that the ECB is exposed to
3 percent of all sovereign risk as a consequence of the SMP
intervention.
The latest literature urges to widen the research examin-
ing a set of ECB’s asset purchase programmes conjointly. In
a comprehensive study, Szczerbowicz et al. (2015) finds that
SMP, OMT and CBPP have been effectively lowering refinanc-
ing costs of banks and governments, especially for periph-
ery countries in the euro area. Further, she reports spillover
effects to non-targeted asset classes, particularly, a 19 ba-
sis points tightening of covered bond spreads upon the SMP
announcement and a 5 basis points tightening of sovereign
bond spreads upon the CBPP announcement. In her study,
she employs an event study approach based on daily data
throughout the time period from 2007 to 2012. Transferred
to a broader sample, Fratzscher et al. (2016) document re-
duced risk aversion, higher equity prices and lower credit
risk for sovereigns and global banks upon the ECB interven-
tion. Most noteworthy, as a consequence of the announce-
ment of the OMT and SMP, equity prices have increased glob-
ally, while contraction in bond yields have been concentrated
in periphery countries within the Eurozone. For Italy and
Spain, for example, the 10-year government bond yield has
declined cumulatively by 74 and 121 basis points, due to
OMT and SMP related announcements, respectively. Con-
secutive work by Krishnamurthy et al. (2017) examines the
relationship more closely proposing that both SMP and OMT
have been much more effective at reducing sovereign bond
yields than the LTRO measures across Italy, Spain and Portu-
gal. Based on the Kalman-filter augmented event study, their
analysis reveals that default risk accounts for 37 percentage
of the reduction in yields. At this early stage, available em-
pirical evidence on the CSPP is limited but points towards
a similar direction as earlier QE studies. According to the
ECB the announcement of the CSPP as such in March 2016
had a significant impact on the secondary market pricing of
corporate bonds. Specifically, the 5-year yield (spread) on
euro area CSPP-eligible bonds has decreased steadily in the
period following the announcement. This downward move-
ment is consistent across all credit rating classes although
more pronounced for lower-rated bonds (European Central
Bank, 2017a). Further empirical research supports the for-
mer findings. For example, Abidi et al. (2017) demonstrate
that the CSPP leads to a significant decrease in euro area cor-
porate bond yield spreads by around 40 basis points. Con-
trary to expectations, they find that the decline is more no-
ticeable in the sample of non-eligible bonds close to the in-
vestment grade threshold. In addition, the authors document
an increase in bond issuance volume, in particular for non-
eligible bonds. This is an important insight implying that - in
line with the notion of spillover effects - the CSPP impact is
not limited to eligible bonds but extends beyond the eligibil-
ity criteria.
Given favourable credit conditions induced by ECB’s ex-
pansionary monetary policy, large corporations are increas-
ingly able to finance themselves through bond issuances
rather than bank loans. At the same time, the inception of
the CSPP has deepened the corporate bond market with an
expanded primary market activity. Arguing in this line the
consequence would then be the contraction in the demand
of bank loans as a funding source creating capacity in the
balance sheet of banks. Consistent with the objectives set
for the CSPP programme, banks should therefore be willing
to divert the flow of credit towards companies that do not
rely on capital markets for their financing, particularly small
and medium-sized enterprises. Indeed, Arce et al. (2017)
observe for Spanish companies that the CSPP has not only
achieved its direct goal of reducing financing costs and stimu-
lating new debt issuances but also has benefited non-eligible
firms by means of a subsequent reallocation in the loan base
of banks, especially in conjunction with the TLTRO. In rel-
ative terms, one euro less in the credit balance of eligible
issuers leads to an increase of around 78 cents of euro in the
credit balance of non-eligible firms following the CSPP. On a
broader level, Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2017) take up this
notion and validate that the intervention in the bond mar-
ket indeed has reduced corporates’ reliance on the banking
system across the euro area, especially of investment grade
corporates with lower credit quality. For their analysis, the
authors use a more representative sample of publicly listed
firms in S&P’s Capital IQ. The DID framework in their study
then reveals that within the set of CSPP-eligible firms, BBB
rated firms increase their bond leverage relative to higher
rated firms (1.6 percentage points versus 1.2 percentage
points). Akin to the former study, Grosse-Rueschkamp et al.
(2017) confirm that banks subject to a high proportion of
CSPP-eligible firms in their portfolios prior to the CSPP an-
nouncement subsequently shift lending to private ineligible
firms.
In conclusion, the impact of the CSPP programme spans
two main dimensions: a relaxation of corporate lending costs
and the spillover to non-targeted assets. Hereof empirical re-
search considers predominantly the corporate bond market,
while evidence on the derivative market is rather scarce.
3. Credit Default Swaps
CDS are classified as credit derivatives. These bilateral
contracts present a relatively recent financial innovation. The
first contract was traded by J.P. Morgan in 1994 to meet the
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increasing demand for transferring counterparty credit risk.
Since then the market has grown remarkably (Augustin et al.,
2014). Nowadays the CDS is the most popular and widely
used instrument amid the broad class of credit derivatives,
inter alia, due to its high degree of convenience with which
market participants can express a view on the credit market
(Blanco et al., 2005, Longstaff et al., 2005).
3.1. Overview of Corporate Credit Default Swaps
Single-name CDS are useful instruments to offset expo-
sure to counterparty credit risk, namely the default risk of a
certain issuer of debt capital. More precisely, two parties en-
ter into an agreement, whereby the CDS buyer acquires pro-
tection from the CDS seller against the default of a third party,
called the reference entity or the name. The reference entity,
a particular company, can be either the issuer or the guar-
antor of the debt obligation. In essence, a CDS contract can
be interpreted as an insurance, since one party intends to in-
sure against the possibility of default while the other party is
willing to bear this risk. Technically speaking, the protection
seller ‘longs’ a third-party credit risk, whereas the protection
buyer ‘shorts’ the credit risk (Blanco et al., 2005, Fontana
and Scheicher, 2016). In contrast to a classical insurance
contract, however, an engagement in a CDS does not require
ownership of the reference asset. In effect, speculators are
able to take long (short) positions in credit risk by selling
(buying) protection without the need to trade the underly-
ing bond (Blanco et al., 2005, Stulz, 2010, Breitenfellner and
Wagner, 2012).14 Hence, investors who provide the capital
are not necessarily those who bear the credit risk. This is an
important insight as according to Stulz (2010) the separation
of funding and risk bearing introduces greater transparency
in the pricing of credit.
Back to a standard CDS contract, protection is sold in ex-
change for the payment of a regular fee at fixed payment
dates (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016, Breitenfellner and Wag-
ner, 2012). As in an interest rate swap (IRS) agreement,
the fee is set such that the initial value of the CDS is zero
which means there is no cash exchange at the time of trade.15
This fee is an annual premium paid over the lifetime of the
contract, generally referred to as the CDS spread or CDS
premium. It is denominated in percentage of the notional
amount insured or in basis points, and to be paid in quar-
terly or semi-annual instalments (Augustin et al., 2014) until
the maturity of the contract or the occurrence of issuer de-
fault (whichever comes first) (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
Most importantly, a CDS contract is written on a single com-
pany rather than on specific bond issues (Chen et al., 2010).
Hence a CDS usually comprises a category of the capital
14Note that, as from November 2012, the European Union has enacted a
regulation that bans short sales of uncovered sovereign debt CDS; corporate
CDS are not subject to this regulation (Regulation, 2012).
15Both legs of a CDS need to have the same value at the inception of
the swap. This is known as the zero net-present-value condition for swaps
and implies that engagement in a CDS does not require a principal payment
(Longstaff et al., 2005, Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
structure, such as the senior, unsecured, or junior debt obli-
gations of the underlying entity, and references a particular
amount of the insured debt, defined as the notional amount
(Augustin et al., 2014).
If a default does not occur over the lifetime of the con-
tract, then the contract will expire at its maturity date and the
protection seller will not pay any compensation. Conversely,
in the case of a default, the contract is terminated prema-
turely and the protection component is triggered, which in
fact is a cash payout reflecting the loss experienced by holders
of defaulted debt obligations (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016,
Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2012). The protection compo-
nent is linked to a specific credit event. This contingent credit
event refers to the case when the underlying entity fails to
meet its obligations for any of a predetermined set of its debt
claims, designated as the reference obligation. Formally, the
occurrence of a credit event must be documented by pub-
lic notice and notified to the investor by the protection buyer
(Augustin et al., 2014). Amid the class of qualifying and valid
credit events are bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default
or acceleration, repudiation or moratorium (for sovereign en-
tities) and restructuring, whereas the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA)16 eventually decides on
whether a credit event has occurred. Put differently, credit
events adhere to the strict standardised definitions laid down
by the ISDA. For example, according to the ISDA documen-
tation the restructuring event refers to the case when either
the interest rate or the principal paid at maturity is reduced or
postponed, a priority ranking of payments is altered, or when
there is a change in the currency or composition of payments
(O’Kane et al., 2003, Blanco et al., 2005, Beber et al., 2009).
Following a credit event, the final settlement can be cash
or physical delivery, depending on the terms of the contract.
Either the protection seller compensates the protection buyer
for the incurred loss by paying the face value of the bond
upon delivery of the defaulted bond (physical settlement),
or by paying the difference between the postdefault market
value of the bond and the notional value (cash settlement).
In particular, with cash settlement the post-default value of
the bond is determined through an auction mechanism. The
monetary exchange involves then only the actual incurred
losses while the protection buyer continues to hold on to the
debt claim on the underlying reference entity’s balance sheet,
given she owns the claim (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016, Au-
gustin et al., 2014).
While in the early days of CDS market participants had
the choice of settling physically or in cash upon the occur-
rence of a valid credit event, for practical reasons, a mar-
ketwide cash settlement mechanism has been implemented
in recent years. The main concern is that, with CDS outstand-
ing greater by multiples than the volume of bonds issued, the
bond market is subject to occasional market squeezes. Ef-
16ISDA provides guidance on legal and institutional details of CDS con-
tracts. The association has played a significant role in the growth of the
CDS market by providing standardized contracts in 1992, the ISDA Master
Agreement, which has been updated continually since then.
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fectively, only few deliverable cash bonds are available in
the market to settle all CDS trades (Blanco et al., 2005).
Investors recognizing this are incentivized to source bonds,
thereby raising artificially the bond price beyond the ex-
pected recovery value, and also increasing the volatility of
the post-default bond. As a consequence, with the intro-
duction of the Big Bang and Small Bang17 protocols, cash
settlements have become gradually convention (Augustin
et al., 2014).
As depicted in Figure 4, under standard physical settle-
ment the protection buyer has to deliver a bond of senior-
ity at least equal to the obligation referenced in the contrac-
tual agreement in the case of a default. In return, the buyer
will receive the full notional amount of the underlying con-
tract. The protection seller can then try to maximize the re-
sale value of the debt claim received or continue to hold on
to it. Most noteworthy, if the credit event occurs in between
the regular premium payment dates, then at the final settle-
ment the protection buyer will also have to pay that part of
the premium to the protection seller that has accrued since
the most recent payment (Longstaff et al., 2005).
Against this backdrop the restructuring event is an inter-
esting feature of CDS contracts. It is considered a ‘soft’ event
because, in stark contrast to other credit events, it allows
for debt restructuring prior to any violation of the contract.
More specifically, provided a firm is in financial distress but
still economically viable, it may be optimal for the firm to
restructure its debt within a private or debt workout while
continuing operations. Within the context of a physical set-
tlement, naturally, some deliverable reference bonds will
be cheaper than others, such as debt with long maturities
and low coupon rates. If there are multiple bonds available
for delivery, the protection buyer will most likely choose to
transfer the ‘cheapest’ bond to the protection seller.18 Hereof
restructuring clauses constrain the set of bonds that are
available for delivery upon the occurrence of a restructuring
event, and specifically prevent the delivery of very long-dated
bonds. In general, there are four different types of restruc-
turing events: the old restructuring clause, the deletion of
restructuring as a credit event, the (American) modified
restructuring and the (European) modified-modified restruc-
turing.19 Intuitively, these restrictions reduce the value of the
cheapest-to-deliver option, and in turn are an important de-
terminant for the pricing of CDS. The higher the value of the
17The landscape for CDS altered significantly with the implementation of
the CDS Big Bang and CDS Small Bang protocols on April 8, and June 20,
2009 for the American and European CDS markets, respectively. The pri-
mary goal of these market changes - mainly affecting the contract and trad-
ing conventions - was to improve the efficiency and transparency within the
CDS market.
18Conceptually, this cheapest-to-deliver option is equivalent to a short po-
sition in a put option. If not otherwise specified in the contract, upon ex-
ercise the protection buyer will have the right to deliver the least valuable
asset among the defined set of eligible reference obligations as long as they
rank pari passu with the reference asset (Blanco et al., 2005). For empirical
evidence on the cheapest-to-deliver option inherent in corporate CDS see
Jankowitsch et al. (2008).
19For an in-depth discussion of the restructuring feature, see O’Kane et al.
(2003) or Berndt et al. (2007).
inherent option to the protection buyer is, the higher the re-
structuring premium and correspondingly the CDS premium
will be (Blanco et al., 2005, Longstaff et al., 2005, Berndt
et al., 2007, Augustin et al., 2014). Contractual clauses at-
tached to the different restructuring credit events have been
adjusted and updated several times by the ISDA. The recent
2014 definitions introduce a number of simplifications to the
Big Bang and Small Bang protocols (Augustin et al., 2014).
Overall, while the restructuring event is particularly relevant
for the cheapest-to-deliver option, it represents at the same
time the most critical aspect in the pricing of CDS contracts.
CDS are the most popular and widely used instrument
amid the broad class of credit derivatives. On the one hand,
CDS allow the mitigation of counterparty risk exposure,
especially for capital or credit exposure constrained busi-
nesses such as banks, pension funds or insurance companies
(Longstaff et al., 2005, Abad et al., 2016). For instance,
CDS are often used by banks for risk management purposes
and are recognized by regulators as a regulatory capital re-
lief (Augustin et al., 2014). On the other hand, speculation
is a significant driver for engagement in the CDS market.
Besides hedging investors are able to gain speculative ben-
efits, specifically from negative credit events. For example,
investors buy CDS not necessarily because they expect a
default but because they anticipate that CDS spreads will
increase further. To cash in the profits, investors will not
be obliged to wait for a default but can rather sell another
CDS.20 To sum up, CDS allow pessimistic investors to bet
against prices (Delatte et al., 2012). Similar to other deriva-
tives, CDS can be viewed as ‘side bets’ on the underlying
assets without any effect on the fundamentals of these assets
(Liu et al., 2017).
Generally speaking, CDS are over-the-counter transac-
tions, not traded on an organized exchange, whereby trades
usually take place between institutional investors and dealers
(Longstaff et al., 2005, Augustin et al., 2014). While dealers
assume the intermediary role, financial institutions, includ-
ing hedge funds and mutual funds, non-financial corpora-
tions, as well as insurances and pension funds are net buyers
of protection. The market is highly concentrated among a
few dominant dealers with the majority of trades relating to
a few reference entities (Augustin et al., 2014, Abad et al.,
2016). In principal, CDS can be negotiated at any time and
in unlimited amounts (Delatte et al., 2012). However, as a
necessary condition, institutional investors and dealers have
to enter into an ISDA Master Agreement, setting up the legal
framework for trading. The ISDA Master Agreement speci-
fies the contractual terms and provides investors with a fully
documented yet flexible contract (Augustin et al., 2014).
3.2. Credit Default Swaps as a Measure of Credit Risk
Credit or default risk associated with a particular com-
pany can be quantified by a number of metrics. Tradition-
20Given an investor wants to liquidate her CDS position, it is more conve-
nient to simply enter into a new swap in the opposite direction than trying
to sell the current position (Longstaff et al., 2005).
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Figure 4: CDS Transactions under Physical Settlement; Source: Markit Group (2008).
The figure describes CDS transactions under physical settlement. Hereby the protection buyer makes fixed periodic payments
to the protection seller, for instance on a quarterly basis. Given a default event occurs, a payout is triggered. The protection
buyer transfers the obligation referenced in the contractual agreement - not necessarily the defaulted bond - and in return
receives the full notional amount of the underlying. In other words, the protection seller is obliged to buy back the defaulted
bond at par value.
ally, the financial health of companies has been assessed by
predicting default probabilities. These probabilities have of-
ten been derived by modelling historical default events in a
logistic-regression framework or by applications of Merton’s
firm value model.21 However, in real life very few companies
do default. As such, these frameworks are hard to calibrate
empirically and subject to the rare-event bias (Opsahl and
Newton, 2015). To overcome potential biases, I will follow
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and choose an
outcome variable that is quantified for a relatively large num-
ber of companies as well as closely related to the risk profile
of a company, namely CDS contracts written on a particular
company.22 Given the underlying company becomes more
risky, respective CDS rates will increase and vice versa. Ac-
cordingly, CDS are considered reliable measures of a firm’s
credit quality, widely used by practitioners and academics to
gauge the market’s perceptions of a firm’s credit risk. In the
broader sense, CDS spreads may also serve as a proxy for the
firm’s cost of wholesale funding (Beau et al., 2014).23
21Such structural default models model explicitly the link between equity
and default (Merton, 1974).
22In particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) use CDS to
isolate default risk premium effects for their estimation purposes.
23There exists a link between the quality of borrowers’ balance sheets and
their access to external finance. Given profits decline and balance sheets
It may well be argued that within financial markets there
are several alternative parameters that can be used to mea-
sure credit risk. Scanning the market for instruments with
near-identical risk and return characteristics as a CDS, while
abstracting from arbitrage, enables the identification of these
parameters. Conceptually, in an arbitrage-free market a CDS
could be replicated by an asset swap, which is a combination
of an IRS and a defaultable coupon bond. The IRS swaps
the coupon of the bond into a reference rate plus spread.
The asset swap is chosen such that the value of the whole
package is par value of the defaultable bond. However, the
arbitrage is not perfect. Unlike CDS, IRS are not affected
by credit events and thus not automatically cancelled at de-
fault (Duffie, 1999). Therefore, spreads of both, the asset
swap and the CDS, can trade at different levels in the mar-
ket for the same issuer and maturity. This differential in
spreads is called basis. Skinner and Townend (2002) claim
that CDS contracts resemble American put options on the
underlying bonds. This is most evident under physical set-
deteriorate, bond investors will anticipate that the expected future cashflows
will not meet the current debt obligations. In turn, as they will have to
assume the additional credit risk, investors will demand a higher credit risk
premium which subsequently increases the external cost of funding, and vice
versa (De Santis, 2016a).
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tlement when the underlying asset is delivered upon exer-
cise. Duffie (1999) provides a more precise theoretical rela-
tion and argues that in absence of arbitrage opportunities the
CDS is identical to a swap of a default-free floating rate note
for a defaultable floating rate note. Hull and White (2000)
build on this pricing model as a key element for the valuation
of CDS.
Despite each of these instruments representing a theo-
retically legitimate measure of credit risk, in reality corre-
sponding spreads across these instruments are not at par-
ity in the short-run for reasons related to liquidity, margin
requirements or simply market frictions (Fontana and Sche-
icher, 2016, Augustin et al., 2014). In this regard, Blanco
et al. (2005) conclude that the CDS rate provides rather an
upper limit on the price of credit risk. Overall, the choice of
CDS as the variable of interest - in comparison to similar fi-
nancial instruments - still is preferable due to simplicity and
data availability.24
Nonetheless, except for a few papers, my focus on CDS
presents a clear deviation from standard literature that as-
sesses the CSPP impact preliminarily with respect to bonds.
At first glance, as the bond market is the predominant area
targeted, the current approach seems reasonable, especially
given the fact that in theory CDS and bond spreads are
closely interlinked and should therefore provide equivalent
results. However, it has been detected empirically that CDS
spreads portray corporate credit risk better than corporate
bond spreads. In other words, the CDS market clearly dom-
inates the bond market in terms of modelling credit risk.
This line of argumentation rests on two main pillars. First,
in CDS markets pure issuer credit risk is priced.25 After all,
in absence of market frictions, the price of a CDS is solely
about the expected default loss and not affected by contrac-
tual provisions such callability, maturity or coupon. In the
bond market, in contrast, issue-specific credit risk and mar-
ket risk are priced in a bundle (Norden and Weber, 2009,
Fontana and Scheicher, 2016, Stulz, 2010). Second, price
discovery takes place predominantly in the CDS market, that
is default-risk related information is reflected earlier in the
CDS market. While the first argument is debated heavily
in the literature, the observed empirical difference between
CDS and bond spreads is indeed proven to be due to infor-
mational problems and market frictions. To shed light on this
matter, in the following I will briefly review the literature on
the different dynamics of cash and derivative markets.
Pioneering work by Longstaff et al. (2005) is fielded us-
ing CDS data of 68 US firms from March 2001 to October
2002 to examine weekly lead-lag relationships between CDS
spread changes, corporate bond spreads and stock returns.
24In practice, for instance, spreads on corporate par yield floaters are dif-
ficult to observe (Hull and White, 2000).
25Yet other studies dispute the validity of the underlying notion, arguing
that CDS rates are not a pure measure of default risk after all, since they
also incorporate a liquidity component (Fulop and Lescourret, 2007, Tang
and Yan, 2007). Moreover, Jarrow (2012) discusses problems with using
CDS to infer implied default probabilities on firms or sovereigns.
In their analysis the authors utilize CDS as a tool to disen-
tangle default from liquidity risk in corporate bond spreads,
as they assume that illiquidity is the non-default component
affecting bonds but not CDS. Indeed, they find that informa-
tion flows first into stock and credit derivative markets and
then into corporate bond markets. Yet, their study shows no
clear lead of the stock market over the CDS market, and vice
versa.26
Blanco et al. (2005) explore the same relationship but
suggest in contrast to the former study that credit risk in CDS
and bond markets is priced relatively equally. In cases where
there is a deviation between corporate bond spreads and CDS
premia, they attribute the difference to the tendency of CDS
premia to lead corporate bond spreads in price discovery.
Besides the authors argue that only well informed investors
trade in CDS markets. Their dataset includes a daily time se-
ries for 33 U.S. and European investment grade companies
during the period from January 2001 to June 2002.
In similar fashion, but based on a longer sample period,
Zhu (2006) attests for a set of 24 investment grade firms from
1999 to 2002 that the CDS market leads the bond market in
terms of price discovery. According to this study, CDS and
corporate bonds spreads from the same firm with the same
maturity horizon are cointegrated that is they may consider-
ably deviate from each other in the short-run but are strongly
linked in the long run. The author concludes that this devia-
tion stems from the higher responsiveness of CDS premia to
changes in credit conditions. In a sample of 58 firms across
US, Europe and Asia covering the period 2000 to 2002, Nor-
den and Weber (2009) examine monthly, weekly and daily
lead-lag relationships in a vector autoregressive model and
further highlight the existence of a cointegration relation-
ship.
Finally, Delatte et al. (2012) abstract from the linear price
discovery model often used in the standard literature and
propose a non-linear method. However, their database re-
lies not on corporate but on sovereign CDS premia from de-
veloped member states of the European Union. Their results
suggest that price discovery varies with the degree of mar-
ket distress. In particular, only during periods of relatively
high distress does the CDS market dominate the informa-
tion transmission between CDS and bond markets. Liu et al.
(2017) further confirm that the information revelation role
of CDS is especially apparent when there is a negative in-
formation shock. Additional empirical evidence on the con-
cept of price discovery with respect to CDS is documented by
Acharya and Johnson (2007), Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014)
and Batta et al. (2016).
Altogether, the CDS market is informationally more effi-
cient absorbing information at a faster pace. This superiority
of CDS over bonds encompasses many aspects but most im-
portantly has it roots in the synthetical nature of CDS which
facilitates a continuous flow of transactions. For example,
26More recent studies actually provide evidence that the equity market
leads both the CDS and bond market, see for instance Forte and Pena (2009)
or Hilscher et al. (2015).
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CDS offer a convenient way to short bonds, whereas estab-
lishing a short position in the bond market is rather prob-
lematic (Norden and Weber, 2009). Especially in times of
financial turmoil, when short sales are particularly valuable
agents tend to retract from the underlying bond market (De-
latte et al., 2012). In this regard, many economists argue that
the existence of short sales, as such, makes a market more
responsive to new information (Stulz, 2010).27 At the same
time, CDS are more flexible and less capital-intense because
they require no principal payments. In contrast, within the
underlying bond market the purchase of a bond generates a
large cash outflow at the initiation of the trade (Norden and
Weber, 2009).
Moreover, bond spreads in the secondary market depend
on the availability and specificity of the total amount of bonds
outstanding, which in turn is related to the issuance activity
of the single firm. Given investors buy bonds with the motive
to hold them until maturity, this curbs market liquidity. Poor
liquidity in the secondary bond market will then make the
purchase of large amounts of credit risk difficult and costly
(Blanco et al., 2005, Longstaff et al., 2005). In stark contrast,
the CDS market is more standardised and less dependent on
primary market issuances (Blanco et al., 2005, Norden and
Weber, 2009). In fact, CDS can be negotiated at any time
and in arbitrarily large amounts. And indeed, the CDS mar-
ket has experienced extraordinary growth over the past years
with CDS outstanding greater by multiples than the volume
of bonds issued.28 To conclude, sensitivity to liquidity effects
reduces the ability of the bond market to reflect information
as timely as the CDS market, especially in the short run. Fur-
ther differences between CDS and bonds can emerge due to
accrued interest, the cheapest-to-deliver option and/or coun-
terparty risk (Delatte et al., 2012).
Although the derivative and the cash market can differ
on the same maturity-same reference entity in the short-run,
CDS and bonds still provide roughly contemporaneous infor-
mation. This is most evident when taking a step back and
recognizing that an investor can conduct a risk-free strategy
by combining the purchase of a bond with the correspond-
ing CDS (Chen et al., 2010, Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
This insight is particularly relevant for the remainder of the
present paper. More specifically, the negative effect of the
CSPP on bond spreads - thoroughly discussed in the litera-
ture - can be transferred to the CDS market and serve as an
anchor to determine the direction of the CSPP effect on CDS
spreads. In fact, the next section takes up this line of reason-
ing to form two hypotheses.
Taken together, the standardized documentation, the liq-
uidity, the ability to customize terms, and the ‘pure’ credit
focus makes CDS contracts convenient to express a view on
the credit market, particularly in regard to the deterioration
or improvement of a firm’s credit quality. Hereby the CDS
27For a formal model, see Diamond and Verrecchia (1987).
28As already mentioned, CDS are also affected by illiquidity, yet to a lesser
degree than bonds. In particular, lack of liquidity is more pronounced for
larger companies as compared to smaller companies (Stulz, 2010).
spread represents the price, market participants are willing
to pay, in order to offset exposure to the reference entity’s
default risk. Therefore, these market-based indicators can
be viewed as an appropriate metric to isolate and quantify
credit risk.
4. Data and Empirical Strategy
Now that I have highlighted the institutional features of
the CSPP initiative and granted a brief overview of corporate
CDS, I proceed by elaborating on the underlying assump-
tions, the estimation method and the sample data used for
the estimation. The aim of this section is to provide a strat-
egy that isolates the direct and indirect effects of the CSPP
programme on those firms whose bonds have been eligible
by the programme.
4.1. Hypotheses
According to recent literature, the announcement of the
CSPP was successfully followed by a significant decline in the
spreads of bonds issued by non-financial corporations (Eu-
ropean Central Bank, 2016). This contraction in credit de-
fault risk - proxied by the bond yield spread or asset swap
spread - establishes the main rationale for my first hypothe-
sis, whereas I resort to CDS spreads as an alternative metric
to quantify credit risk. If the transmission mechanism of the
CSPP is the default risk channel, I will expect the following:
H0: CDS spreads for CSPP companies and non-
CSPP companies decline around the CSPP pur-
chase shock.
My first hypothesis claims that CSPP purchases have evoked
a specific market reaction, particularly a contraction in CDS
rates. Given the CSPP succeeds in stimulating the economy,
one should observe a reduction in expected defaults and, as
a result, a decline in corporate default risk. The implicit as-
sumption is that the policy lowers bond yields in order to
increase the expected repayments of bondholders. Standard
asset pricing models predict that investors’ risk aversion will
also fall as the economy recovers. More specifically, dimin-
ishing CDS premia would then be related to an increase in
investors’ risk appetite, underlining the lower default risk
perception, and ultimately the lower default risk premium
(Fontana and Scheicher, 2016, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2013).29 Thus,
evidence in favour of H0 would be consistent with the pro-
gramme’s objective of lowering risk premia across the Euro-
pean non-financial corporate sector.
29Default risk premium may also diminish due to the possibility of risk
mitigation by means of CDS. Put differently, the CSPP effect will be corrobo-
rated, given the reduction of CDS spreads allows a firm’s creditors to hedge
their credit risk at a relatively lower cost. In turn, creditors’ willingness to
supply credit to the same CDS-referenced firm will increase. This is, how-
ever, not the object of this paper and leaves space for future research.
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Figure 5 plots the evolution of CDS prices from 2015 to
2017 for both entities that have issued CSPP bonds and en-
tities that have not issued CSPP bonds, hence CSPP com-
panies and non-CSPP companies.30 Clearly, asset purchase
programmes have been launched in response to widening
credit spreads reflecting the overall adverse economic devel-
opments in the Eurozone. At the aggregate level, this graph-
ical evidence underlines my hypothesis that the CSPP has
moved the credit market. In fact, following the announce-
ment in March 2016, denoted by the left vertical line in the
graph, decreasing CDS spreads are visible over the long run.
Nonetheless, this can only be taken as tentative evidence sup-
porting H0 as the announcement date and the subsequent
decrease in CDS spreads may be driven by some latent omit-
ted variables. In order to formally test whether the reduction
in CDS rates is certainly caused by the new policy, I propose
the DID estimation as elaborated in the next subsection.
On the contrary, the impact of the official implementa-
tion date of the CSPP, denoted by the right vertical line in the
graph, is rather ambiguous with a slight pick-up shortly after
June 8, 2016. In line with the efficient market hypothesis it
may be argued that the announcement per se absorbs avail-
able price information immediately for all bonds at the aggre-
gate level such that the implementation date on its own be-
comes trivial (Fama, 1970). In this respect, Arce et al. (2017)
disclose in their study that the CSPP effect on bond yields is
more attenuated for the implementation date as compared
to the announcement date (7.6 basis points versus 46 ba-
sis points). Further, they report that during the first month
of purchases the effects are slightly higher with a value of
around 8 basis points. Taking this into consideration, it is
reasonable to focus on the announcement effect of the newly
implemented policy as a basis to derive the hypotheses. This
is also the current practice in the literature (see for example
Gagnon et al., 2011, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2011, Arce et al., 2017). However, if anything, I expect a
lower bound estimate on the CSPP effect.
In the context of the second conjecture, my paper is
closely related to the work by Abidi et al. (2017). They doc-
ument that the CSPP impact on bond yield reduction is most
noticeable in the sample of bonds that have not been subject
to CSPP purchases. Though at first glance this may appear
counter-intuitive, a closer look suggests that higher credit
risk firms - typically a subset of non-CSPP companies – are
supposed to benefit from the new policy on a larger scale.
Indeed, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and
Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2013) detect the pattern that the
decline in CDS rates, following a QE policy, is more profound
for firms with lower credit quality. This line of argument
30The data is extracted from Markit and comprises all non-financial CDS
outstanding, irrespective of the fact whether firms have issued bonds pur-
chased by the ECB under the CSPP policy. Bonds and companies that are
subject to the CSPP policy are labelled as CSPP bonds and CSPP companies,
respectively. This applies analogously for non-CSPP bonds and non-CSPP
companies. Note, however, that the definition of ‘non-CSPP’ here deviates
from the definition provided in the Section 4.2 and the definition used in the
empirical estimation.
rests on the fact that benefits associated with the CSPP do
not accrue selectively but extend to non-targeted assets.
Figure 5 allows a comparison of CDS premia between
CSPP and non-CSPP companies. Not surprisingly, there is a
high degree of comovement in the CDS spreads of these two
groups, reflecting the exposure to common macroeconomic
factors. Over the whole sample period, though, spreads for
the CSPP group are on average lower than that of the bench-
mark. Given the strict eligibility criterion for CSPP purchases,
such as preliminarily targeting investment grade bonds, it is
not surprising that the ECB is more inclined to buy bonds as-
sociated with lower credit risk. Throughout the year 2015,
the spread for both groups widens substantially, reaching its
peak in early March 2016. Shortly before the announcement
of the programme on March 10, 2016, spreads exhibit a con-
siderable decrease. This fall in spreads continues around
the date of the announcement and thereafter, interrupted
only by temporary phases of uncertainty in May and June.
The United Kingdom’s referendum on the European Union
membership may be related to widening spreads, but the ef-
fect seems short-lived (European Central Bank, 2016). Over
the course of the second half of the year 2016, spreads de-
cline more gradually. Overall, by November 2017, the CSPP
group reaches a new all-time low of about 60 basis points,
which marks a reduction of 80 basis points relative to the
peak in early March 2016. The downward trend is, however,
more pronounced for the non-CSPP group with a tightening
in spreads by about 170 basis points, from roughly 270 ba-
sis points in March 2016 to around 100 basis points at the
end of year 2017. Interestingly, from mid-2017 onwards,
spreads of the CSPP and the non-CSPP group slightly con-
verge. As of this date, spreads are also more stable. At the
aggregate level, this may suggest that while credit risk has
reduced overall, the impact on the non-CSPP group will be
more striking. The existence of potential spillover effects dic-
tates my second hypothesis which reads:
H1: CDS spreads for non-CSPP companies will
decline relatively more than for CSPP companies
around the CSPP purchase shock.
H1 supports the view that the transmission mechanism of
the CSPP operates as desired beyond the eligibility criteria.
In fact, the reduction in funding costs induced by the CSPP
should be reflected in substantially lower costs of default in-
surance, especially for riskier credits. When CDS rates de-
cline relatively more for non-CSPP firms as expected, the
CSPP policy contributes endogenously through spillover ef-
fects, in line with the theory of the portfolio rebalancing
channel (Altavilla et al., 2015).
4.2. Empirical Strategy
This subsection elaborates on the underlying estimation
method to test the hypotheses formed in the previous subsec-
tion. A simplistic approach to estimate the impact of CSPP
may be to compare CDS rates across entities issuing pur-
chased bonds and non-purchased bonds while exclusively
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Figure 5: CDS Spread Evolution by CSPP Purchases; Source: Markit (author’s own computations).
The figure presents the evolution of weekly CDS prices. The CDS set is split among those firms issuing bonds that are effectively
purchased under the CSPP (CSPP) and those firms issuing bonds not subject to the new policy (non-CSPP). The observation
window ranges from January 2015 to November 2017. The CSPP announcement in March 2016 is denoted by the left vertical
line, while the right vertical line labels the official start of the CSPP in June 2016.
focusing on the post-intervention time, that is the period
succeeding the purchase date. However, biased estimates
may result when prior to that period differences in prices
between the two groups exist. In order to establish causal-
ity I adopt a DID analysis which explicitly considers differ-
ences in prices prior to the policy implementation. In partic-
ular, the DID method identifies causal effects by contrasting
the change in outcomes pre- and post-intervention, for the
treatment and control group.31 DID assumes that, in the ab-
sence of treatment, prices remain unchanged and then trends
within treatment and control groups are equivalent. This as-
sumption of parallel trends allows the averages of the time-
invariant unobserved variables to differ between treated and
control groups, provided their effects do not change over
time (Bertrand et al., 2004, Lechner, 2011, Morris et al.,
2013).32
The basic DID regression is given by the following equa-
tion:
Yi t = α+ βTreati tPott + γTreati t +δPostt + εi t (1)
where i and t index firm and time observations. Yi t is
31For an early study in this vein, see Ashenfelter (1978).
32It is worth emphasizing that, in contrast to the current practice in the
literature, I refrain from employing an event study methodology. The under-
lying rationale is that there are serious identification issues with this econo-
metric approach, such as neglecting key announcement dates or ignoring
the simultaneous implementation of policies (see for example Gilchrist and
Zakrajšek, 2013 or Fratzscher et al., 2016).
the outcome of interest, Treati t (=1 if bond of firm i is pur-
chased at day t) is a dummy for CSPP entities and Postt (=1
beginning from the initial purchase date and thereafter) is an
indicator for the post-CSPP period. Furthermore, the equa-
tion includes a constant α and a random error term εi t . The
coefficient β is the DID estimator and identifies the treatment
effect of the CSPP, as the treatment is Treati tPostt . The eval-
uation period is seven trading days before and after the pur-
chase date of the respective bond.
Controlling for fixed effects rules out the concern that
findings are explained by heterogeneous effects of the CSPP
policy on CDS rates. By this means I am able to capture firm
specific differences such as unobserved differences in local
economic environments, management quality, or the cost of
capital (Gormley and Matsa, 2013). Thus, in my estimations
the basic DID regression is complemented by the inclusion of
fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant fac-
tors at the firm level as well as time-varying fixed effects.
The baseline regression reads:
CDS Spreadi t = α+ βTreati tPott + θi + ϑt + εi t (2)
where θi are firm fixed effects and ϑt are day fixed effects.
Moreover, CDS Spreadi t is the outcome of interest. Note that
Pott will be absorbed by the time fixed effects. But what if the
relationship between CDS premia and the regressor is non-
linear? As Figure 6 shows, the distribution of CDS spreads
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is skewed to the left33 whereas its logged value appears nor-
mally distributed.
When assuming a linear model, I may obtain biased es-
timates of the effects of the CSPP on spreads. That is why I
adjust the benchmark regressions to a semi log estimation by
changing the dependent variable to log CDS Spreadi t .
logCDS Spreadi t = α+βTreati tPostt +θi +ϑt +εi t (3)
All coefficients in the non-linear regression are un-
changed except for the outcome of interest, that is
logCDS Spreadi t . In all specifications, I cluster standard
errors at the firm level. Apart from that, the regressions spec-
ified previously are estimated on daily CDS spreads using the
DID approach in combination with robust standard errors to
account for heteroscedasticity. Overall, my research hypothe-
ses suggest decreasing CDS spreads for entities in both the
control and treatment sample, and increasing spreads for
entities in the treatment group as compared to the control
group. Thus, support for the hypotheses requires β > 0 and
δ < 0.34
Studying the CSPP impact empirically requires solving an
identification problem which relates to the endogeneity of
CSPP-eligible bonds. Indeed, given the nature by how the
CSPP policy is implemented, bonds that are accepted in the
CSPP portfolio differ systematically from bonds which are
not. In fact, the assignment of bonds to the CSPP portfolio
is discrete and follows strictly the specific eligibility criteria
developed by the ECB (see Section 2.2). Therefore, the com-
parison between eligible and non-eligible bonds or firms is
likely to capture the effect of these (observable and unob-
servable) differences rather than capturing the causal effect
of the CSPP. For example, low credit risk issuers - most likely
to be part of the CSPP due to fulfilling the admission criteria -
might have been less credit constrained before the start of the
CSPP, relative to high risk underperforming issuers (Grosse-
Rueschkamp et al., 2017). Ignoring this issue would then
lead to the underestimation of CDS rates, and in turn, to bi-
ased estimates based on the standard regression analysis.
I overcome this obstacle by restricting the sample to CSPP
firms, thus a subset of firms that issues at least one bond that
is eventually to be purchased by the ECB. At the same time
by exploiting the gradual implementation of the CSPP policy,
namely the time dimension with which bond purchases have
been executed, a potentially exogenous source of variation is
generated that I can use to estimate the effect of the CSPP
reform. In other words, the distinct purchase dates allow
me to compare a subsample of firms transferred primarily to
33Provided that the trade takes place between institutional investors and
dealers, a left-skewed distribution indicates that most dealers exhibit low
counterparty risk while a few dealers have higher counterparty risk (Giglio,
2014).
34This in in line with the work by Abidi et al. (2017). Note that a negative
estimate for β would be at odds with the second hypothesis but by no means
rule out the existence of spillover effects. Rather this scenario would indicate
that the CSPP impact on non-targeted firms is not as strong as expected.
the CSPP portfolio (treatment group) with firms transferred
later (control group).35 This suggests that in the control sam-
ple there will be companies having issued at least one bond
purchased under CSPP over the course of time since the basis
for the selection of these companies is the bond purchase list
published by the ECB (see next subsection). However, as the
relevant purchase date is succeeding the post-CSPP period of
seven trading days36 for my estimation purposes these firms
are not viewed as treated firms. In this light in the following,
firms in the treatment and control sample will be referred to
as CSPP and non-CSPP firms, respectively. Figure 7 schemat-
ically summarizes the empirical strategy.
The following example illustrates the empirical strategy:
data is retrieved on a daily basis with the sample period be-
ginning in t = 0. Firm A has issued a bond that is effectively
purchased under the CSPP on day t = 1. Firm A will be as-
signed to the treatment group for the purchase day t = 1.
Firm B from the same industry has issued a bond that is pur-
chased on day t = 8, that is one week later. As this date
is beyond the evaluation period, firm B serves as a control
variable. In aggregate, the within CSPP-sample analysis mit-
igates concerns related to omitted variables.
Another challenging task is related to the fact that the
ECB decides to purchase bonds on distinct days. While on
the one hand this is convenient for the purpose of demon-
strating a direct effect between the CSPP and the change
in CDS spreads, on the other hand running a single regres-
sion on the full sample to pinpoint the aggregate effect of
the policy on a single day will not be possible. Moreover,
as elaborated earlier, the main assumption upon which the
DID approach rests is that of parallel trends. However, clus-
tering all firms together can violate the former assumption
as firms across different industries may not be comparable.
For example, the insurance sector is likely to be negatively
affected by accommodative monetary policies, because the
ability to generate adequate interest income is severely im-
paired when credit risk is low at the aggregate level (Mertens,
2017). From a statistical perspective, an industry specific
analysis addresses the heterogeneity concern that may re-
main in each sub-panel. Hence I run the DID regression at
the industry level for each of the industries identified. Ob-
servations within an industry context also allow adherence
to the underlying assumption of the DID approach.
4.3. Sample Data
The construction of the sample data is constrained by the
availability of CDS. Indeed, reliable CDS data is available for
a very low number of companies. Against this backdrop, the
data collection is separated into two parts. First I seek to col-
lect CSPP sample data at the aggregate level from the ECB
35Abidi et al. (2017) rule out the issue of selection bias by only considering
bonds close to the eligibility threshold. They assume that in this case the
admission to the CSPP portfolio will be random. Grosse-Rueschkamp et al.
(2017), in contrast, define non-rated European firms with public debt as the
benchmark.
36Purchases are published on a weekly basis, hence there is at least one
week between each purchase date.
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Figure 6: Distribution of CDS Spreads; Source: Markit (author’s own computations).
The figure shows the distribution of CDS spreads for the entire sample. The mean spread level throughout the entire sample
equals 79.368 basis points and the median value is 64.706 basis points. The standard deviation of spread levels is fairly high
at 58.57 basis points. Overall, the distribution is highly left-skewed but conforms closer to the pattern of the Gaussian normal
distribution after transforming it with the natural logarithm.
Figure 7: Empirical Strategy; Source: author’s own contribution.
The figure shows that in both the treatment and the control sample there will be CSPP companies in the course of time. The
assignment to treatment remains reasonable as it is based on bonds purchased the first time through the CSPP. At the same
time, companies in the control sample will have issued CSPP bonds eventually. However, the respective purchase date is
succeeding the post-evaluation period of seven trading days.
website; subsequently I will combine the dataset with CDS
pricing data extracted from Markit. The peculiar admission
to the treatment and control sample as proposed in the pre-
vious subsection will be then discussed below in more detail.
The ECB publishes a list of bonds purchased and held un-
der the CSPP with the respective purchase dates. This list
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includes each bond’s International Securities Identification
Number (ISIN) and is updated on a weekly basis. Similar
to other asset purchase programmes, CSPP purchases are an-
nounced ex post which allows the exploitation of the official
intervention as an exogenous, unexpected reduction in the
supply of corporate bonds traded amongst investors.
As CDS premia are written on a single company, compris-
ing a set of multiple bonds, I will have to consider the ref-
erence or parent company of each purchased bond in order
to construct a reasonable benchmark for the DID estimation.
Thus, the underlying data is retrieved from Bloomberg by
matching each bond with its ultimate parent company using
the ISINs. From Bloomberg I also collect information that
includes bond level characteristics such as amount outstand-
ing, coupons, country, currency, payment rank and maturity
to redemption. Additionally, I obtain the rating at launch of
the corporate bond issuances from four rating agencies S&P,
Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and Dominion Bond Rating Services.
I follow Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2017) and use the credit
rating at bond level as a proxy for the rating of the ultimate
parent issuer. The implicit assumption is that the parent is-
suer rating is positively correlated with issue ratings, and fur-
ther, that credit ratings are positively correlated across rating
agencies. In total, there are 72 firms in my sample.
I use Markit as the central source for the CDS data. Markit
offers comprehensive pricing data, collected directly from
market markers, and subject to a rigorous data cleaning pro-
cess.37 However, matching the ECB’s list of purchased bonds
with the CDS data is not straightforward. The main concern
is that in Markit CDS prices are not mapped to single ISINs
but identified through a unique 6-digit REDCode number as-
signed by Markit for each reference company. As mentioned
previously, CDS contracts are written on issuers and not ap-
preciated at the issue level. Accordingly, prices are only avail-
able at the company level. Therefore, to avoid collecting data
by hand, an intermediate step is required. I need to match
the multiple bonds to the 6-digit REDCode with the aid of
the ISINs. Only then am I able to match reference entities
between the two data sources, whereby the matching proce-
dure here will be based on the 6-digit REDCode.
After merging datasets and removing missing observa-
tions, I am able to identify 52 firms with available CDS data
for the sample period between January 2015 and Novem-
ber 2017. The series covers the quoted spread, the reference
company, the seniority tier,38 the currency, the country, the
industry, the recovery rate39 and the restructuring clause lev-
els of the respective CDS on a daily basis. In addition, 16
37Note that I do not observe bid and ask quotes for CDS spreads, but only
mid quotes. In particular, Markit reports spreads that are obtained by aver-
aging the quotes reported by various financial institutions, inter-dealer bro-
kers, and electronic trading platforms (Giglio, 2014). Moreover, reported
CDS quotes reflect the sell-side offering price and not the finally agreed price
between counterparties (Liu et al., 2017).
38The credit risk a CDS references is not limited to a particular bond or
loan, but comprises a predetermined set of debt obligations. Markit defines
by means of the seniority tier the level of risk of these debt claims.
39The recovery rate corresponds to the industry standard value of 40 per-
cent for all CDS contracts in the sample (Chen et al., 2010).
firms are dismissed because in the corresponding industries
no bonds have been purchased by the ECB, or because the
spread data does not cover the period from January 2015
until November 2017. In total, 36 firms remain in the sam-
ple.
Most noteworthy, there is no one-to-one correspondence
between a CDS spread and its underlying entity, as the 6-
digit REDCode identifies CDS contracts for all available re-
structuring and seniority characteristics. I follow Berndt and
Obreja (2010) and Mertens (2017) who select 5-year con-
tracts with modified-modified restructuring clause for senior
unsecured Euro denominated debt. These are considered to
be the most liquid CDS contracts in the European market.40
As discussed earlier, restructuring events are less straightfor-
ward as compared to other credit events. Nevertheless, for
my estimation I will focus on the modified-modified restruc-
turing clause, which is most popular in Europe. It imposes
a maturity limit of 60 months for restructured obligations
and 30 months for all other obligations (Berndt et al., 2007,
Augustin et al., 2014). My approach is motivated by recent
evidence. In the absence of restructuring as a credit event,
lenders to a reference company who also trade CDS linked
to that same reference company - known as empty creditors
- are likely to be tougher during debt renegotiations, refus-
ing private workouts and making distressed borrowers more
vulnerable to bankruptcy. For example, buyers of ‘no re-
structuring’ CDS contracts with bankruptcy as a credit event
will only be paid if the reference firm files for bankruptcy
(Pollack, 2003, Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). For a formal
model see Bolton & Oehmke (2011). One implication of the
model is that the empty creditor problem is, in fact, priced in
CDS premia. Hence, to avoid any distortion of results I will
opt for restructuring as a credit event, particularly for the
modified-modified restructuring clause. It should be noted
that the overall tightening of the data comes at the expense
of severely reducing the number of observations. As an ex-
ample, consider the data for the company Aegon N.V. In the
full dataset, there are 4009 observations for the 5-year ma-
turity CDS, but after filtering for the seniority tier and the
restructuring clause, only 743 remain.
After applying this filter, I am able to construct a repre-
sentative sample of the treatment and control group. Hereby,
within each industry, entities issuing peri-CSPP bonds serve
as the treatment variable while the rest are assigned to the
control group (see Figure 7). The key point, though, is to
avoid the assignment to the control group occurring arbitrar-
ily. Hence, for each treated firm I select only comparable
firms from the same industry. More specifically, comparable
firms are defined as those firms that - with respect to the CDS
spread series - exhibit a similar pre-treatment trend as the
treated group (see Appendix). The parallel trend assumption
is, as already stated, an important prerequisite underlying the
DID estimation. Overall, of the 36 firms, 9 can be assigned to
the treatment group and 23 firms can be assigned to the con-
40Blanco et al. (2005), Longstaff et al. (2005) and Norden and Weber
(2009) also choose the benchmark maturity of five years.
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trol group. Table 2 presents characteristics of the 32 firms
included in the final sample. The table lists the reference
entities, together with basic descriptive information, such as
the S&P credit rating, the country and the currency, as well as
the daily spread average at the firm and industry level, and
finally the number of observations in the CDS series. Each
industry group is well diversified across ratings and country
of risk, whereby the country selection is due to data availabil-
ity. Control firms, on average, have slightly higher spreads as
compared to treated firms (74.538 basis points versus 72.300
basis points).
It may be argued that the sample size of 32 firms in this
context is not realistic. But according to a report by the
International Capital Market Association the non-sovereign,
non-financial CDS sector is in general modestly represented,
while sovereign and financial CDS dominate the European
CDS market. In fact, government and financial CDS con-
tribute to 58 percent of the total notional outstanding as of
29 September 2017 (Callsen and Hill, 2018). Hence the data
I use is not ideal but the best currently available for my pur-
pose.
5. Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical findings regarding the
CSPP impact on CDS prices. To recap, this paper seeks to
examine two main questions.
• Do CDS rates increase relative to the time before the
CSPP announcement?
• Do CDS rates increase less for CSPP-eligible firms rela-
tive to the control group (eligible firms not yet subject
to the CSPP) and relative to the time before the CSPP
announcement?
The regression specified in the previous section is estimated
on daily CDS spreads using the DID approach in combination
with robust standard errors to account for heteroscedastic-
ity. The main regressor is the interaction term of the bond
CSPP purchase dummy Treati t (=1 if bond of entity i is pur-
chased at day t) and the time dummy variable Postt (=1 from
the initial purchase date and thereafter), that indicates the
post-purchase period. The evaluation period is seven trad-
ing days before and after the purchase date of the respective
bond. Empirical results are listed in Table 3 to 7, for each in-
dustry separately. Columns (1) to (3) show the results with
CDS Spreadi t as the main dependent variable. Columns (4)
to (6) show the results with logCDS Spreadi t as the main
dependent variable. This pattern is analogous for Table 3 to
7.
Column (1) starts with the specification that only includes
the post-programme dummy term, Postt , while controlling
for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. The em-
pirical result for the Basic Materials sector suggests that -
in line with the first hypothesis - after the bond purchase
(Postt ), all entities in this industry experience an average
decrease of 9 basis points in their CDS spreads. In column
(2) the model is then further saturated with the interaction
term Treati t Postt . Here the results are strengthened with a
value of around 11 basis points for Postt (see Table 3). Simi-
larly, for the Industrials sector CDS rates drop by up to more
than 5 basis points (see Table 7). For the remaining three sec-
tors CDS rates do not change as appreciably with the CSPP
implementation. Corresponding figures are between 0 and
3 basis points (see Table 4 to 6). Hence, firms in the Basic
Materials sector experience the largest fall in CDS rates, fol-
lowed by the Industrial sector. In all instances, the estimates
of the coefficient Postt are negative. In terms of statistical sig-
nificance, daily CDS rates across industries are significantly
more negative, after the CSPP purchase day than previously,
in 7 out of 9 instances. These results hint towards a system-
atic decline in spreads following CSPP purchases.
In order to be able to infer causality I take a closer look
at the interaction term Treati t Postt in column (2). In agree-
ment with the second conjecture, only a positive sign of the
term Treati t Postt implies that after the purchase date, and
conditional on being purchased, spreads of treated entities
drop less than spreads of their non-CSPP counterparts. For
the Basic Materials sector this difference in drop is indeed
positive and robust to the inclusion of entity fixed effects.
Particularly, CDS rates have decreased post-CSPP purchase by
almost 9 basis points less for the treated firm relative to con-
trol group firms and relative to the pre-CSPP event. Hence,
this finding indicates the existence of spillover effects of the
CSPP programme.
However, it is possible that time-specific shocks are driv-
ing the results. Column (3) controls for time-specific shocks
(time fixed effects) as defined in Equation (2). Naturally, the
post-programme dummy term Postt is dropped when adding
day fixed effects, as the programme affects all entities at a
specific point in time. The magnitude of the coefficient still
remains fairly constant across the specification and the stan-
dard error does not vary significantly. Thus, for the Basic
Material sector, spillover effects are indeed evident (see Ta-
ble 3). However, across industries there is no clear pattern
with respect to the sign of the coefficient of the interaction
term, as detected for Postt . A similar effect can only be ob-
served for one subset of the Industrial sector. In fact, the
bond purchase on April 30, 2017 prompts CDS rates of the
treatment group (Atlantia S.p.A.) to decline by 4 basis points
less as compared to the control group (see Table 7). For the
remaining three industries corresponding coefficients are ei-
ther statistically insignificant or the magnitude is negligible
in economic terms (below 1 basis point). Note that in 6 out of
9 cases where the interaction term is statistically significant,
3 carry a positive sign and 3 a negative sign. Two important
implications can be drawn from these findings. First, the for
the most part low but highly significant estimates implicate
that there is actually an association between the CSPP and
CDS rates. Second, irregularities with respect to the sign of
the coefficients do not allow for interpretations on spillover
effects as postulated in the second hypothesis.
However, it might be the case that the prior relationship is
non-linear. To account for that I run the same regression but
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Table 2: Sample Description
The table summarizes the final database after filtering, comprising 5-year CDS denominated in EUR for France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom in a period ranging from January 2015 to November 2017. Mean spreads are calculated in basis points; (1) purchased on
August 8th, 2016 (2) purchased on August 15th, 2016 (3) purchased on October 3rd, 2016 (4) purchased on January 23rd, 2017 (5) purchased on May 1st,
2017.
Entity Currency Country Rating S&P Observations Mean
Panel A: Basic Materials
Koninklijke DSM N.V. EUR Netherlands A- 743 40.142
LINDE Aktiengesellschaft EUR Germany BBB 743 30.103
LANXESS Aktiengesellschaft (1) EUR Germany BBB 743 71.885
XSTRATA LIMITED EUR United Kingdom BBB+ 743 244.212
Panel B: Financials
Aegon N. V. (1) EUR Netherlands A- 743 87.929
Allianz SE EUR Germany AA- 743 38.185
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI EUR Italy A+ 743 110.186
AXA EUR France A- 743 58.702
NN Group N. V. EUR Netherlands BBB 743 70.018
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO SE EUR France A 743 60.592
Panel C: Industrials
Airbus Group SE EUR Netherlands BBB+ 479 65.538
Airbus Group N.V. EUR Netherlands BBB+ 110 51.858
ATLANTIA S. P. A. (1),(5) EUR Italy A 743 66.599
BRISA - AUTO-ESTRADAS DE PORTUGAL, S. A. EUR Portugal A 742 126.100
BRISA - CONCESSAO RODOVIARIA, S. A. EUR Portugal A 743 125.810
HeidelbergCement AG (4) EUR Germany BBB- 743 113.051
THALES EUR France BBB+ 743 51.187
Lafarge EUR France BB+ 743 54.775
PostNL N. V. (2) EUR Netherlands BBB+ 743 54.281
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft EUR Germany AA- 743 36.376
COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN EUR France BBB+ 743 63.776
VINCI EUR France BBB+ 743 52.595
Panel D: Telecommunications Services
Deutsche Telekom AG EUR Germany BBB+ 743 45.348
Orange (1) EUR France A- 743 58.990
Vivendi EUR France BBB 743 62.271
Panel E: Utilities
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG EUR Germany A- 743 53.941
ENEL S. P. A. EUR Italy A- 743 86.083
ENGIE (1) EUR France A- 589 55.754
E.ON SE (1) EUR Germany AA- 743 73.969
EDISON S. P. A. (3) EUR Italy BBB 743 64.815
Iberdrola S.A. EUR Spain BBB+ 743 72.735
RWE Aktiengesellschaft EUR Germany A+ 708 92.226
71.360
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Table 3: CSPP Effects on CDS Spreads in Basic Materials Sector (7 Trading Days)
Table 3 presents the DID regression for the subsample of entities within the Basic Materials sector. This table checks whether entities within the treated sample
are affected differently in terms of CDS spreads relative to the control group. The dependent variable is the corporate CDS spread. The main regressor is
an interaction term of a bond CSPP purchase dummy Treat i t (=1 if bond of entity i is purchased at day t) and a time dummy variable Post t , that indicates
the purchase of the respective bond under the CSPP (=1 from August 8, 2016 and after). Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the linear regression of Eq. 2.
Columns (3) to (6) use the semi log regression of Eq. 3. Observations are between 7 trading days before and after August 8, 2016 and the bond purchased
has been issued by Lanxess AG; Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C DS Spreadi t log(C DS Spreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -8.934*** -11.09*** -0.0680*** -0.0772***
(2.019) (2.625) (0.00782) (0.00995)
Treat i t Post t 8.615*** 8.615*** 0.0370*** 0.0370***
(2.643) (3.074) (0.0111) (0.0106)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56
Entities 4 4 4 4 4 4
R-squared 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.999 0.999 0.999
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Table 4: CSPP Effects on CDS Spreads in Telecommunications Services Sector (7 Trading Days)
Table 4 presents the DID regression for the subsample of entities within the Telecommunications Services sector. This table checks whether entities within
the treated sample are affected differently in terms of CDS spreads relative to the control group. The dependent variable is the corporate CDS spread. The
main regressor is an interaction term of a bond CSPP purchase dummy Treat i t (=1 if bond of entity i is purchased at day t) and a time dummy variable
Post t , that indicates the purchase of the respective bond under the CSPP (=1 from August 8, 2016 and after). Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the linear
regression of Eq. 2. Columns (3) to (6) use the semi log regression of Eq. 3. Observations are between 7 trading days before and after August 8, 2016 and
the bond purchased has been issued by Orange S.A.; Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C DS Spreadi t log(C DS Spreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -1.471*** -1.350*** -0.0276*** -0.0257***
(0.205) (0.243) (0.00389) (0.00473)
Treat i t Post t -0.364 -0.364** -0.00551 -0.00551**
(0.453) (0.140) (0.00843) (0.00221)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
Entities 3 3 3 3 3 3
R-squared 0.995 0.995 1.000 0.995 0.995 1.000
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
on the logarithm of the dependent variable (logCDS Spreadi t
) as defined in Equation (3). The initial results are broadly
unchanged. For the most part, the Postt coefficients in col-
umn (4) and (5) keep their signs and remain highly signif-
icant across industries, when previously designated as sta-
tistically significant. Again, the effects are most striking for
the Basic Materials sector as presented in Table 3. Follow-
ing the bond purchase by the ECB, within this industry, CDS
spreads exhibit on average a decrease between 7 and 8 per-
cent. Most noteworthy, the CDS spread for the treatment en-
tity decreases by 3.77 percentage points less relative to the
control group after the announcement of the CSPP. Likewise,
within the Industrials sector (for the issuer Atlantia S.p.A.)
CDS spreads drop on average by 6 percent post-CSPP. This
finding is highly significant and holds for both, the purchase
date in 2016 and 2017. Interestingly, only for the latter pur-
chase date the coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and sizeable with a figure of roughly 6 percentage points (see
Table 7).
For the CDS rates of issuers Engie S.A. and E.ON Interna-
tional Finance B.V. from the Utilities sector there is a signifi-
cant decline of the order of around 4 percent after the ECB
conducts the bond purchases, whereas post-CSPP and rela-
tive to the control group the effect between the treated and
control group becomes statistically indistinguishable from
zero (see Table 6). The Financials sector experiences a drop
in spreads of similar magnitude, but again the interaction is
not statistically different from zero (see Table 5). Moreover,
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Table 5: CSPP Effects on CDS Spreads in Financials Sector (7 Trading Days)
Table 5 presents the DID regression for the subsample of entities within the Financials sector. This table checks whether entities within the treated sample
are affected differently in terms of CDS spreads relative to the control group. The dependent variable is the corporate CDS spread. The main regressor is
an interaction term of a bond CSPP purchase dummy Treat i t (=1 if bond of entity i is purchased at day t) and a time dummy variable Post t , that indicates
the purchase of the respective bond under the CSPP (=1 from August 8, 2016 and after). Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the linear regression of Eq. 2.
Columns (3) to (6) use the semi log regression of Eq. 3. Observations are between 7 trading days before and after August 8, 2016 and the bond purchased
has been issued by Aegon N.V.; Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C DS Spreadi t log(C DS Spreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -3.147*** -3.118*** -0.0430*** -0.0447***
(0.364) (0.416) (0.00455) (0.00528)
Treat i t Post t -0.172 -0.172 0.0104 0.0104
(0.818) (0.584) (0.00902) (0.00677)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
Entities 6 6 6 6 6 6
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.998
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Table 6: CSPP Effects on CDS Spreads in Utilities Sector (7 Trading Days)
Table 6 presents the DID regression for the subsample of entities within the Utilities sector. This table checks whether entities within the treated sample are
affected differently in terms of CDS spreads relative to the control group. The dependent variable is the corporate CDS spread. The main regressor is an
interaction term of a bond CSPP purchase dummy Treat i t (=1 if bond of entity i is purchased at day t) and a time dummy variable Post t that indicates
the purchase of the respective bond under the CSPP. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the linear regression of Eq. 2. Columns (3) to (6) use the semi log
regression of Eq. 3. Observations are between 7 trading days before and after August 8, 2016 and October 3, 2016, for Panel A and B respectively. Purchased
bonds are issued by Engie S.A. and E.ON International Finance B.V. as shown in Panel A; and by Edison S.p.A. shown in Panel B; Robust standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel A: 8 August 2016 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -2.603*** -2.740*** -0.0396*** -0.0390***
(0.188) (0.232) (0.00261) (0.00311)
Treat i t Post t 0.480 0.480** -0.00222 -0.00222
(0.385) (0.224) (0.00576) (0.00215)
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98
Entities 7 7 7 7 7 7
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.999 0.997 0.997 1.000
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Panel B: 3 October 2016 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t 0.447** 0.622** 0.00673** 0.00918**
(0.221) (0.272) (0.00290) (0.00356)
Treat i t Post t -0.877*** -0.877** -0.0123*** -0.0123**
(0.292) (0.354) (0.00378) (0.00481)
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
Entities 5 5 5 5 5 5
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.999
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
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Table 7: CSPP Effects on CDS Spreads in Industrials Sector (7 Trading Days)
Table 7 presents the DID regression for the subsample of entities within the Industrials sector. This table checks whether entities within the treated sample
are affected differently in terms of CDS spreads relative to the control group. The dependent variable is the corporate CDS spread. The main regressor is
an interaction term of a bond CSPP purchase dummy Treat i t (=1 if bond of entity i is purchased at day t) and a time dummy variable Post t , that indicates
the purchase of the respective bond under the CSPP. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the linear regression of Eq. 2. Columns (3) to (6) use the semi log
regression of Eq. 3. Observations are between 7 trading days before and after the specific purchase date as shown in Panel A to D respectively. Purchased
bonds are issued by Atlantia S.p.A. as shown in Panel A and B; and by PostNL N.V. and HeidelbergCement Finance B.V. shown in Panel C and D respectively;
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel A: 8 August 2016 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -5.272*** -5.343*** -0.0575*** -0.0558***
(0.468) (0.525) (0.00344) (0.00375)
Treat i t Post t 0.639 0.639 -0.0151* -0.0151***
(0.707) (0.586) (0.00802) (0.00435)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126
Entities 9 9 9 9 9 9
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Panel B: 1 May 2017 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -3.889*** -4.292*** -0.0577*** -0.0638***
(0.467) (0.499) (0.00625) (0.00667)
Treat i t Post t 4.030*** 4.030*** 0.0611*** 0.0611***
(0.929) (0.699) (0.0109) (0.0105)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Entities 10 10 10 10 10 10
R-squared 0.994 0.994 0.997 0.994 0.995 0.998
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Panel C: 15 August 2016 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t -1.591*** -1.624*** -0.0202*** -0.0190***
(0.399) (0.457) (0.00348) (0.00391)
Treat i t Post t 0.268 0.268 -0.00984 -0.00984**
(0.515) (0.626) (0.00632) (0.00459)
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112
Entities 8 8 8 8 8 8
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Panel D: 23 Januar 2017 C DSSpreadi t log(C DSSpreadi t)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post t 0.0719 0.176 0.00459 0.00628
(0.323) (0.356) (0.00427) (0.00471)
Treat i t Post t -0.939 -0.939** -0.0151* -0.0151**
(0.722) (0.452) (0.00869) (0.00611)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126
Entities 9 9 9 9 9 9
R-squared 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.998
Entity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES
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following the CSPP policy, for Telecommunication companies
the sign on the interaction estimate is reversed and negative,
which seems to negate the existence of spillover effects in
connection with the second assumption. However, the figure
is relatively small in economic terms (see Table 4). Overall,
the most pronounced impact in lowering credit risk can be
observed for the sector of Basic Materials with a decrease of
8 percent. Noticeable evidence on spillover effects can be
inferred from the Industrial sector with a value equal to 6
percentage points. In 7 out of 9 instances where the inter-
action term is statistically significant, 2 carry a positive sign
and 5 carry a negative sign. Despite assuming non-linearity,
the results of this exercise do not contribute to further in-
sights. These findings rather suggest that spillover effects
are limited to specific bonds (which is most evident for the
issuer Atlantia S.p.A.). Note that the large R-squared values
throughout all specifications are based on the fact that fixed
effects often capture a lot of the variation in the data.
6. Discussion
The CSPP was designed to complement the main thrust of
ECB’S QE policy. The overall goal has been to ease financial
conditions for corporates, and ultimately to support a sus-
tained economic recovery in the euro area. This paper adds
to the strand of literature to study the CSPP impact, and es-
pecially the spillover effects of monetary policy decisions on
related financial markets. While it is difficult to be certain
about the effects of the CSPP policy without a greater body
of experience than is so far available, some provisional con-
clusions may be possible.
To summarize, I find that, consistent with the initial as-
sumption, the CSPP programme has contained credit risk
across European non-financial corporates. The results indi-
cate that credit market reactions to the CSPP event - mea-
sured by means of CDS prices - imply negative CDS rates
throughout. In contrast, spillover effects to non-CSPP firms
have been heterogeneous within and across industries. The
empirical support for the second conjecture is limited, and
if anything, rather bond specific. Hence, the ECB’s commit-
ment to continue the CSPP is indeed helping to lift credit
constraints overall, but according to my estimation the pro-
gramme seems to not have stronger effects on firms not sub-
ject to the CSPP, as suggested by previous work.
A potential critique of the above analysis is related to the
identification strategy. While the second hypothesis is moti-
vated by the fact that the reduction in CDS rates - prompted
by the CSPP - spills over to riskier CDS instruments, in the
estimation the full sample is restricted to the CSPP portfolio.
In other words, the implicit assumption underlying the em-
pirical strategy is that control group firms transferred later
to the CSPP portfolio are higher credit risk firms and thus
non-CSPP-eligible which is, however, not necessarily true. As
elaborated earlier, the empirical strategy is convenient as it
dismisses any endogeneity concerns. Nonetheless, defining
a too narrow control group may lead to inconsistent results.
In this respect, the sample could be extended to select Euro-
zone investment grade-rated companies issuing USD denom-
inated bonds into the control group. An alternative control
group may comprise European investment grade-rated firms
that are incorporated in countries outside of the Eurozone.
These approaches would still alleviate any endogeneity con-
cerns, as treated companies would most likely not differ sys-
tematically from the control group except by the currency
or country. Next to that, as in my estimation there are only
32 firms with available CDS spreads, an adjustment of the
sample as proposed would indeed allow access to a larger
database which may in turn complement the prior results.
However, such analyses are beyond the scope of this paper,
leaving space for future research.
At the aggregate level, it may well be argued that CDS
contracts as such are restrictive for the evaluation of the CSPP
impact. In fact, CDS do not refer to a single bond but to a
firm, which issues various bonds. And indeed, the prevail-
ing examination hints towards the fact that CSPP purchases
are having a systematic effect at the individual bond-level,
whereas the effect on the entity as a whole is rather ambigu-
ous. Beyond that there are some other shortcomings associ-
ated with this financial instrument. As discussed earlier, CDS
rates present rather an upper limit on the price of credit risk.
In fact, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) find that the inception
of CDS increases the credit risk of underlying reference enti-
ties due to the higher likelihood of credit rating downgrades
and bankruptcy. The increase in credit risk is also associated
with the absence of borrower monitoring and tougher debt
renegotiations. Similarly, Arce et al. (2017) report that the
cost of debt of risky firms actually increases after CDS trading
is initiated. Hence, the choice of CDS as the variable of inter-
est may lead to distorted results because estimation results,
if anything, will be biased upwards.
However, this line of reasoning omits a certain impor-
tant aspect, that is that the CSPP announcement date ab-
sorbs pricing-relevant information for the most part, gener-
ating lower bound estimates for the individual purchase date
(Arce et al., 2017). In aggregate, there exists the issue of an
overestimation on the one hand, and an underestimation on
the other hand. Prospective research will be required to dis-
entangle these two effects, and disclose whether they offset
each other.
Within this context, it is also crucial to understand that
the predominant focus on CDS quotes may be too simplis-
tic. Instead, a shift towards a composite dataset of both CDS
transaction data and CDS quotes may provide a more com-
prehensive picture of CDS activities, revealing supplemen-
tary information on referenced firms. Further, as a robustness
check future research may consider multi-name CDS instru-
ments which typically represent the more liquid part of the
relevant single-name CDS market (Fontana and Scheicher,
2016). Corresponding CDS spreads would then serve as a
more powerful indicator of credit risk.
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